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Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions
Citations
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Cited by:
- Mirowski, Philip, 2007. "Markets come to bits: Evolution, computation and markomata in economic science," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 209-242, June.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001.
"Voluntary Implementation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Agnieszka Lipieta, 2018. "Adjustment processes resulting in equilibrium in the private ownership economy," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 10(4), pages 305-332, December.
- Andreas Pfingsten & Andreas Wagener, 1997. "Centralized vs. Decentralized Redistribution: A Case for Interregional Transfer Mechanisms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 4(4), pages 429-451, November.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005.
"Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wilkie, Simon & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Working Papers 1150, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Joel Watson, 2007.
"Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 55-81, January.
- Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2m08n7cg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Watson, Joel, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt18x0r2nn, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 322, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2008.
"L’analyse économique des normes sociales : une réévaluation de l’héritage hayékien,"
Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 22(4), pages 103-137.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2007. "L'Analyse Economique des Normes Sociales: una Réévaluation de l'Héritage Hayékien," ICER Working Papers 45-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2008. "L'analyse économique des normes sociales : une réévaluation de l'héritage hayékien," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00270841, HAL.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2008. "L'analyse économique des normes sociales : une réévaluation de l'héritage hayékien," Post-Print halshs-00270841, HAL.
- Amoros, Pablo, 2004.
"Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
- Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009.
"The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy,"
The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(3), pages 259-279, September.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek's legacy," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00346389, HAL.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek's legacy," Post-Print halshs-00346389, HAL.
- Raul V. Fabella, 2013. "Moral Hazard and Cooperation in Competing Teams," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201308, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
- Håkan J. Holm, 2004. "Rights and Decentralized Computation," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2‐3), pages 290-317, May.
- Walter Trockel, 1999.
"On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
788, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Trockel, Walter, 2017. "On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 306, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Vitale, Corinne & Meijerink, Sander & Moccia, Francesco Domenico & Ache, Peter, 2020. "Urban flood resilience, a discursive-institutional analysis of planning practices in the Metropolitan City of Milan," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 227-242, February.
- Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012.
"Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
- Buzard, Kristy & Watson, Joel, 2010. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3df3q4vg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996.
"The allocation of a shared resource within an organization,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December.
- Ledyard, John O. & Noussair, Charles & Porter, David, "undated". "The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization," Working Papers 917, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Ledyard, J.O. & Noussair, C. & Porter, D., 1994. "The Allocation of Shared Resource within an Organization," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1063, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Walter Trockel, 2002.
"Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
- Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 305, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Raul V. Fabella, 2013. "Salience and Cooperation Among Rational Egoists," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201309, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
- Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2010.
"On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 17-25, March.
- Haake, Claus-Jochen & Trockel, Walter, 2011. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 393, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011.
"Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 3-19, June.
- Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 3-19.
- Eric Brousseau & Pierre Garrouste & Emmanuel Raynaud, 2011. "Institutional Changes: Alternative Theories and Consequences for Institutional Design," Post-Print peer-01003150, HAL.
- Pierre Garrouste & E. Brousseau & E. Raynaud, 2011. "Institutional Changes: Alternative Theories and Consequences for Institutional Design," Post-Print hal-00574577, HAL.
- Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Efficient institutions," Working Papers 08-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2014. "Efficient contract enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 161-183, January.
- Roberto Serrano, 2005.
"Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003,"
Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
- Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Edna Tusak Loehman & Richard Kiser & Stephen J. Rassenti, 2014. "Cost Share Adjustment Processes for Cooperative Group Decisions About Shared Goods: A Design Approach," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 1085-1126, September.
- Joel Watson, 2013.
"Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.
- Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0wx67671, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November.
- Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2009. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: General Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3923q7kz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016.
"On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game,"
The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.
- Duman, Papatya & Trockel, Walter, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash Solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein’s game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 550, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Prasnikar, Janez & Mikerevic, Dragan & Voje, Damjan, 2014. "Blockholding and organisational diversity: the case of a transition economy," Journal of East European Management Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 19(3), pages 277-304.
- Edna T. Loehman, 2009. "Voluntary Cost-Sharing for Environmental Risk Reduction: A Pollution Abatement Case Study," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 349-368, July.