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L’analyse économique des normes sociales : une réévaluation de l’héritage hayékien

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  • Agnès Festré
  • Pierre Garrouste

Abstract

[fre] Dans cet article nous montrons, dans un premier temps, que la référence à la notion de sélection de groupe n’est pas incohérente avec les autres éléments de la pensée hayékienne. Nous développons ensuite l’idée que les travaux récents en matière d’émergence et d’évolution des normes sociales valident, mais en partie seulement, les thèses hayékiennes en la matière. Enfin, nous mettons en évidence les lacunes de l’analyse de Hayek et proposons des moyens d’y remédier. [eng] The Economics of Social Norms : a New look at Hayek’s Legacy. . In this paper we first show that the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s writings. Second we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

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  • Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2008. "L’analyse économique des normes sociales : une réévaluation de l’héritage hayékien," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 22(4), pages 103-137.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2008_num_22_4_1717
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2008.1717
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2008.1717
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    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B3 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General

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