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Financing Auction Bids

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Oleksii Birulin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2022. "On advance payments in tenders with budget constrained contractors," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 733-762, December.
  2. Banerji, Sanjay & Fang, Dawei, 2021. "Money as a weapon: Financing a winner-take-all competition," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
  3. repec:ehu:dfaeii:8758 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Byoung Jun & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2014. "Security bid auctions for agency contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 289-319, December.
  5. Meng Zhang & Shulin Liu, 2022. "Effects of risk aversion in auctions without and with default," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(3), pages 731-737, April.
  6. Burkett, Justin, 2016. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  7. Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2015. "Financing bidders in takeover contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 534-557.
  8. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & FLÁVIO MENEZES & MATTHEW RYAN, 2015. "Default and Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Auctions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 49-77, February.
  9. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & S. Viswanathan, 2004. "Merger Mechanisms," Working Papers 2004.7, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  10. Ottorino Chillemi & Claudio Mezzetti, 2014. "Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 335-355, February.
  11. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2010. "Debt- Versus Equity-Financing in Auction Designs," Staff General Research Papers Archive 31517, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  12. Sano, Ryuji, 2023. "Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  13. Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1017, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  14. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2011. "Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1806-1841, August.
  15. Burkett, Justin, 2015. "Endogenous budget constraints in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 1-20.
  16. Liu, Tingjun & Parlour, Christine A., 2009. "Hedging and competition," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 492-507, December.
  17. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020. "First-price auctions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  18. Clarence Bush, 2010. "Increasing Diversity in Telecommunications Ownership and Increasing Efficiency in Spectrum Auctions by Breaking the Link Between Capital Market Discrimination and FCC Spectrum Auction Outcomes," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 37(2), pages 131-152, June.
  19. Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2013. "Auctions with contingent payments — An overview," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 666-675.
  20. Lagziel, David, 2019. "Credit auctions and bid caps," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 416-422.
  21. Matthew Ryan & Flávio Menezes, 2013. "Default and Renegotiation in PPP Auctions," Discussion Papers Series 484, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  22. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2015. "The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 234-261.
  23. Francesco Decarolis, 2009. "When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 717, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  24. Baisa, Brian & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2016. "Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 162-165.
  25. Dirk Engelmann & Jeff Frank & Alexander K. Koch & Marieta Valente, 2023. "Second‐chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(3), pages 484-511, September.
  26. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2014. "Bidding under auctioneer default risk," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 123-133.
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