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Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Peter-J. Jost, 2023. "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 463-496, June.
  2. Bose, Pinaki, 1995. "Anticipatory compliance and effective regulatory activity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 151-159, June.
  3. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to Market versus Taking to Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(8), pages 2246-2276, August.
  4. Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 71, pages 5-35.
  5. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1989. "Limited commitment and costly enforcement," Working Paper 90-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  6. Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Agricultural pollution of water, moral hazard and optimal audit policies [Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau]," Post-Print hal-01201071, HAL.
  7. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  8. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 158-209, March.
  9. Jiancai Pi, 2011. "Relational Incentives in Chinese Family Firms," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(4), pages 511-524, December.
  10. Michael Kirschenheiter, 1999. "Optimal Contracting, Accounting Standards, and Market Structures," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(2), pages 243-276, June.
  11. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2016. "Marking to Market versus Taking to Market," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393184, HAL.
  12. Leon Yang Chu & David E. M. Sappington, 2010. "Contracting with private knowledge of signal quality," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 244-269, June.
  13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4mmob120cl8g9ph8aisjq72u3h is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Arun Malik, 2008. "The Desirability of Forgiveness in Regulatory Enforcement," Working Papers 2008-14, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
  15. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4mmob120cl8g9ph8aisjq72u3h is not listed on IDEAS
  16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7pu0mfr14h9ba9rsrotsskha8c is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Arun Malik, 2014. "The Desirability of forgiveness in regulatory enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-22, August.
  18. Andersson, Fredrik & Skogh, Goran, 2003. "Quality, self-regulation, and competition: the case of insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 267-280, April.
  19. de la Fuente, Angel & Marin, JoseMaria, 1996. "Innovation, bank monitoring, and endogenous financial development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 269-301, October.
  20. Amin H. Amershi & Peter Cheng, 1989. "On the demand for historical events recording and maintenance of audit trails," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 72-90, September.
  21. Schnedler, Wendelin, 2000. "Who gets the Reward? An Empirical Exploration of Bonus Pay and Task Characteristics," IZA Discussion Papers 235, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  22. Gao, Pingyang, 2013. "A measurement approach to conservatism and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 251-268.
  23. Giuseppe Lanza & Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Pietro Navarra, 2020. "Can Citizens Affect the Performance of Their Elected Representatives? A Principal–Agent Model of Strategic Interaction in Democratic Systems," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-14, July.
  24. Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  25. Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Working Papers 026, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
  26. Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard & Gabel, H. Landis, 1997. "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 331-346, July.
  27. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Imperfect state verification and financial contracting," Working Papers (Old Series) 9506, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  28. Kirkegaard, René, 2023. "Endogenous criteria for success," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  29. Neri, Marcelo Côrtes, 2015. "Microinsurance: income risk, social security and the demand for private onsurance by low-income families," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 771, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
  30. Spulber, Daniel F, 1992. "Economic Analysis and Management Strategy: A Survey," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 535-574, Fall.
  31. Kishore Gawande & Alok K. Bohara, 2005. "Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(11), pages 1593-1609, November.
  32. Fu, Renhui & Gao, Fang & Kim, Yong H. & Qiu, Buhui, 2017. "Performance volatility, information availability, and disclosure reforms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 35-52.
  33. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78.
  34. Gigler, Frank & Hemmer, Thomas, 2002. "Informational costs and benefits of creating separately identifiable operating segments," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 69-90, February.
  35. Neunzig, Alexander R., 2002. "Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Überwachungskosten," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  36. George Georgiadis & Balazs Szentes, 2020. "Optimal Monitoring Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2075-2107, September.
  37. Joost de Laat, 2008. "Household Allocations and Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0827, CIRPEE.
  38. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7pu0mfr14h9ba9rsrotsskha8c is not listed on IDEAS
  39. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2004. "Auditing policies and information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 86, Econometric Society.
  40. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 02-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  41. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007. "Ranking Contingent Monitoring Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1501-1509, September.
  42. Hans Gersbach, 1998. "On the Equivalence of General and Specific Control in Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(5), pages 730-737, May.
  43. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August.
  44. Li, Anqi & Yang, Ming, 2020. "Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  45. Xiao, Ping & (Jack) Chen, Xinlei & Chen, Yuxin & Lu, Wei, 2021. "Violation behavior in vertical restraint: Empirical analyses in the case of retail price maintenance," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 953-973.
  46. Clemens Listner & Irmgard Niemeyer & Morton Canty & Gotthard Stein, 2016. "A strategic model for state compliance verification," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 260-271, April.
  47. Ying Yan, 1997. "Credit rationing, bankruptcy cost, and the optimal debt contract for small business," Working Papers (Old Series) 9702, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  48. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European Case," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-62, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  49. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
  50. Ying Yan, 1996. "Credit Rationing, Bankruptcy Cost, and Optimal Debt Contract for Small Business," Finance 9612003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  51. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100.
  52. Mukherji, Arijit & Nagarajan, Nandu J., 1995. "Moral hazard and contractibility in investment decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 413-430, May.
  53. Huseyin Cavusoglu & Birendra Mishra & Srinivasan Raghunathan, 2005. "The Value of Intrusion Detection Systems in Information Technology Security Architecture," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 16(1), pages 28-46, March.
  54. Parkash Chander, 2004. "Risk Aversion and Income Tax Enforcement," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 531, Econometric Society.
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