Optimal Contracting, Accounting Standards, and Market Structures
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1999.tb00580.x
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- Dennis H. Caplan & Michael Kirschenheiter, 2000. "Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 387-428, September.
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