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A strategic model for state compliance verification

Author

Listed:
  • Clemens Listner
  • Irmgard Niemeyer
  • Morton Canty
  • Gotthard Stein

Abstract

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016

Suggested Citation

  • Clemens Listner & Irmgard Niemeyer & Morton Canty & Gotthard Stein, 2016. "A strategic model for state compliance verification," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 260-271, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:63:y:2016:i:3:p:260-271
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.21689
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kanodia, Cs, 1985. "Stochastic Monitoring And Moral Hazard," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 175-193.
    2. Rudolf Avenhaus & Morton J. Canty, 2011. "Deterrence, technology, and the sensible distribution of arms control verification resources," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(3), pages 295-303, April.
    3. Ronald A. Dye, 1986. "Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 339-350, Autumn.
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