My bibliography
Save this item
The Optimality of Being Efficient
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
- Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 2002.
"Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather,"
Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 333-345, March.
- Kerr, Suzi & Cramton, Peter, 1998. "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," RFF Working Paper Series dp-98-34, Resources for the Future.
- Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, 2002. "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Papers of Peter Cramton 02eptc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 06 May 2002.
- Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather," Working Papers 197846, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Discussion Papers 10668, Resources for the Future.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2005.
"Optimal Second-Degree Price Discrimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information Among Buyers,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 337-360, Summer.
- Doh Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2001. "Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers," Economics Working Papers 624, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2005.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2003. "Optimal Second-degree Price Discrimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information among Buyers," Working Papers 21, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction," Discussion Papers 03-036, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2012.
"System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
10acmhc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2012. "System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 12acmhc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000.
"Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-252, May.
- Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999.
- Marco Pagnozzi, 2007.
"Bidding to lose? Auctions with resale,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 1090-1112, December.
- Marco Pagnozzi, 2004. "Bidding to Lose? Auctions with Resale," CSEF Working Papers 116, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Nov 2006.
- Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2003. "Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25910, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Gert Brunekreeft & Roland Meyer & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2013. "Auction Design for a Strategic Reserve Market for Generation Adequacy: On the Incentives Under Different Auction Scoring Rules," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0014, Bremen Energy Research.
- Georganas, Sotiris, 2011. "English auctions with resale: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 147-166, September.
- Sui, Yong, 2006. "All-pay auctions with resale," MPRA Paper 11463, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007.
- Renée Birgit Adams & Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, 2012.
"How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company,"
International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 197-226, June.
- Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, 2000. "How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company," CESifo Working Paper Series 292, CESifo.
- Felli, Leonardo & Cornelli, Francesca, 2001. "How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2881, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cornelli, Francesca & Felli, Leonardo, 2010. "How to sell a (bankrupt) company?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4685, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2009.
"A Coase Theorem Based on a New Concept of the Core,"
Staff General Research Papers Archive
13051, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2010. "A Coase Theorem based on a new concept of the core," ISU General Staff Papers 201005140700001134, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2001.
"A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-5.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions," Papers 99-73, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-73, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Englmaier, Florian & Guillén, Pablo & Llorente, Loreto & Onderstal, Sander & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2009.
"The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 286-291, March.
- Sander Onderstal & Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Rupert Sausgruber, 2004. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Papers 2004.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1782, CESifo.
- Gallien, Jérémie. & Wein, Lawrence M., 2003. "Design and analysis of a smart market for industrial procurement," Working papers WP 4137-00., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Wynne P. Jones, 2012. "System and Method for an Auction of Multiple Types of Items," Papers of Peter Cramton 11acjam, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Levent Ülkü, 2013.
"Optimal combinatorial mechanism design,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(2), pages 473-498, June.
- Levent Ulku, 2009. "Optimal Combinatorial Mechanism Design," Working Papers 0903, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Marco Pagnozzi, 2007. "Should Speculators Be Welcomed in Auctions?," CSEF Working Papers 176, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Tröger, 2006.
"Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 753-769, May.
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2004. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Microeconomics 0405005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Garratt, Rod & Tröger, Thomas, 2005. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 42, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Garratt, Rod & Tröger, Thomas, 2005. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 10/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2006.
"Monopoly with resale,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 362-375, June.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Monopoly with Resale," Working Papers 2003.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1393, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1405, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hidvegi, Zoltan & Wang, Wenli & Whinston, Andrew B., 2006. "Buy-price English auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 31-56, July.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000385, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
- Jérémie Gallien & Lawrence M. Wein, 2005. "A Smart Market for Industrial Procurement with Capacity Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 76-91, January.
- James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2003. "Auctions for Procuring Options," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 41-51, February.
- Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020.
"Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, "undated". "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1001r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2020.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2004. "The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 371-392, June.
- Robert W. Day & S. Raghavan, 2007. "Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1389-1406, September.
- Lawrence Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004.
"Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(3), pages 493-505, March.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing," Papers of Peter Cramton 99wpvic, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jun 1999.
- William S. Lovejoy, 2006. "Optimal Mechanisms with Finite Agent Types," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(5), pages 788-803, May.
- Álvarez, Francisco & del Río, Pablo, 2022. "Is small always beautiful? Analyzing the efficiency effects of size heterogeneity in renewable electricity auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
- Robert W. Day & S. Raghavan, 2009. "Matrix Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 916-933, August.
- Filiz-Ozbay, Emel & Lopez-Vargas, Kristian & Ozbay, Erkut Y., 2015. "Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-16.
- Charles Zheng, 2000. "An Optimal Auction When Resale Cannot Be Prohibited," Discussion Papers 1303, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.