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Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2017. "Optimal Liability when Consumers Mispredict Product Usage," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(1), pages 202-243.
  2. Hori, Masahiro & Iwamoto, Koichiro, 2013. "Match-Rigging in Professional Sumo-Elucidation of Incentive Structures and Empirical Analysis-," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 64(2), pages 132-146, April.
  3. Hoffmann, Sandra A. & Hanemann, W. Michael, 2005. "Torts and the Protection of "Legally Recognized" Interests," Discussion Papers 10472, Resources for the Future.
  4. Parisi Francesco & Singh Ram, 2010. "The Efficiency of Comparative Causation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 219-245, September.
  5. Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt & Jenny Monheim & Birgit Will & Georg Haas, "undated". "The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the Polluter Pays to the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2008-1-1214, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  6. Eric Helland & Seth A. Seabury, 2016. "Are Settlements in Patent Litigation Collusive? Evidence from Paragraph IV Challenges," NBER Working Papers 22194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September.
  8. Feldman Allan M. & Singh Ram, 2011. "A Simple Guide to Comparative Vigilance," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-24, October.
  9. Alice Guerra & Tobias M. Hlobil, 2018. "Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 325-348.
  10. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe, 2006. "On the Optimal Scope of Negligence," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 331-364, January.
  11. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
  12. Polborn, Mattias K., 2023. "Incentives for investments in defensive technology: An economic analysis of the Safety Act," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  13. Hatzis, Aristides N., 2002. "Having the cake and eating it too: efficient penalty clauses in Common and Civil contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 381-406, December.
  14. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 183-257, Elsevier.
    • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  15. Ram Singh, 2001. "Efficient Liability Rules When Courts Make Errors in Estimation of the Harm : Complete Characterization," Working papers 99, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  16. Ann L. Brower & Philip Meguire & Adrian Monks, 2010. "Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(3).
  17. Parisi, Francesco & Schulz, Norbert & Depoorter, Ben, 2003. "Symmetry and asymmetry in property: Commons and anticommons," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 46, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
  18. Parisi, Francesco & Schulz, Norbert & Depoorter, Ben, 2005. "Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 578-591, December.
  19. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2009. "Negative Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 21-59, January.
  20. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Law," Discussion Papers 05-005, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  21. Eguchi Kyota, 2008. "Damages or Reinstatement: Incentives and Remedies for Unjust Dismissal," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 443-474, December.
  22. F. P. van Tulder & B. C. J. van Velthoven, 2003. "Econom(etr)ics of crime and litigation," Statistica Neerlandica, Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research, vol. 57(3), pages 321-346, August.
  23. Chris Shugart, 1998. "Regulation-by-Contract and Municipal Services: The Problem of Contractual Incompleteness," Development Discussion Papers 1998-09, JDI Executive Programs.
  24. Ram Singh, 2002. "Characterization of Efficient Product Liability Rules: When Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 110, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  25. Francesco Parisi & Norbert Schulz & Ben Depoorter, 2004. "Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 175-190, March.
  26. Ram Singh, 2002. "Causation, Economic Efficiency and the Law of Torts," Working papers 102, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  27. Ganuza Juan-Jose & Gomez Fernando, 2006. "Caution, Children Crossing: Heterogeneity of Victim's Cost of Care and the Negligence Rule," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 365-397, January.
  28. Ram Singh, 2009. "RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, February.
  29. Tim Friehe, 2007. "On the incentive effects of damage averaging in tort law," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7.
  30. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  31. Jain Satish K., 2012. "Decoupled Liability and Efficiency: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 697-718, December.
  32. Jain Satish K. & Kundu Rajendra P., 2015. "Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficiency of Liability Rules," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 453-480, November.
  33. Singh, Ram, 2007. "‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 179-203.
  34. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  35. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
  36. Ram Singh, 2001. "Effects of Courts' Errors on Efficiency of Liability Rules: When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 97, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  37. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
  38. Satish K. Jain & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2004. "Economic Efficiency, Distributive Justice and Liability Rules," Working papers 130, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  39. Emanuela Carbonara & Alice Guerra & Francesco Parisi, 2016. "Sharing Residual Liability: The Cheapest Cost Avoider Revisited," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 173-201.
  40. Ram Singh, 2005. "Comparative Causation -- A Re-examination," Working papers 139, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  41. Waibel Michael, 2016. "Eurobonds: Legal Design Features," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 635-657, November.
  42. Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July.
  43. Jain, Satish K. & Kundu, Rajendra P., 2006. "Characterization of efficient simple liability rules with multiple tortfeasors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 410-427, September.
  44. De Geest, Gerrit, 2013. "N problems require N instruments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 42-57.
  45. Eric Helland & Darius Lakdawalla & Anup Malani & Seth A Seabury, 2020. "Unintended Consequences of Products Liability: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Market [“An Economic Analysis of Mary Carter Settlement Agreements,”]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 598-632.
  46. Guiseppe Dari Mattiaci & F. Parisi, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
  47. Norbert Schulz & Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, 2002. "Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 594-613, December.
  48. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide," Working Papers 2008-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  49. Andrea Castellano & Gustavo Ferro & Maximiliano Miranda Zanetti, 2023. "Product Liability: Detecting Potential Risks in New Products," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 856, Universidad del CEMA.
  50. Ram Singh, 2016. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria in the Law of Torts: An Enquiry into the Doctrine of Causation," Working Papers id:11237, eSocialSciences.
  51. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
  52. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  53. Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, 2013. "The economics of activity levels in tort liability and regulation," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 2, pages 33-53, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  54. Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu, 2006. "Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 8(3), pages 523-561.
  55. Jaivir Singh, 2006. "Separation of powers and the erosion of the ‘right to property’ in India," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 303-324, December.
  56. baffi, enrico, 2012. "The Failure of Decoupling Liability and Other Mistakes in Tort Law," MPRA Paper 42242, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  57. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  58. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe, 2014. "The reasonable person standard: trading off static and dynamic efficiency," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 249-267, April.
  59. Radygin Alexandr & Entov Revold & Apevalova E. & Shvetsov P., 2008. "Market Discipline and Contracts: Theory, Empiric Analysis, Law," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 117P.
  60. Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, 2016. "Is the Government Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent-Domain Exercises," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 437-469.
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