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The economics of activity levels in tort liability and regulation

In: Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law

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  • Nuno Garoupa
  • Thomas S. Ulen

Abstract

One of the great successes of the law and economics movement has been the use of economic models to explain the structure and function of broad areas of law. The original contributions to this volume epitomize that tradition, offering state-of-the-art research on the many facets of economic modeling in law.

Suggested Citation

  • Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, 2013. "The economics of activity levels in tort liability and regulation," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 2, pages 33-53, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14720_2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & De Geest, Gerrit, 2006. "When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 336-354, September.
    2. Aaron S. Edlin & Pinar Karaca-Mandic, 2006. "The Accident Externality from Driving," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 931-955, October.
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
    4. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
    5. Peter A. Diamond, 1974. "Single Activity Accidents," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 107-164, January.
    6. Gilles, Stephen G, 1992. "Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 319-363, June.
    7. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2006. "Strict liability versus negligence when the injurer's activity involves positive externalities," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 95-104, July.
    8. Tabbach Avraham D., 2008. "Causation and Incentives to Choose Levels of Care and Activity Under the Negligence Rule," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 133-152, May.
    9. Francesco Parisi, 2004. "Comparative Causation," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 6(2), pages 345-368.
    10. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1980. "Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting," NBER Working Papers 0420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Ben-Shahar, Omri, 1998. "Should Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 325-357, October.
    12. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe, 2006. "On the Optimal Scope of Negligence," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 331-364, January.
    13. Nell, Martin & Richter, Andreas, 2003. "The design of liability rules for highly risky activities--Is strict liability superior when risk allocation matters?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 31-47, March.
    14. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
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