IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rlecon/v12y2016i3p635-657n8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Eurobonds: Legal Design Features

Author

Listed:
  • Waibel Michael

    (Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, CB3 9BL Cambridge)

Abstract

In light of proposals for Eurobonds, this article explores central legal features of the Eurobond proposals. Section 2 focuses on the development of the law governing sovereign bonds and assesses the potential, but limited role of international law for Eurobonds. Section 3 considers the equal treatment of bondholders, looking at the two potential sources of non-discrimination obligations for sovereign bonds and their relevance to Eurobonds. Section 4 turns to two crucial design features of Eurobonds which existing proposals mostly address only in passing: (i) which legal entity issues Eurobonds; and (ii) what form of debt mutualization Eurobonds involve.

Suggested Citation

  • Waibel Michael, 2016. "Eurobonds: Legal Design Features," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 635-657, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:12:y:2016:i:3:p:635-657:n:8
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0046
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0046
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/rle-2016-0046?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2012. "Debt dilution and seniority in a model of defaultable sovereign debt," Working Papers 12-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    2. Christoph Trebesch & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2018. "ECB Interventions in Distressed Sovereign Debt Markets: The Case of Greek Bonds," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 66(2), pages 287-332, June.
    3. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy [Greek bond buyback boondoggle]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 28(75), pages 513-563.
    4. Jean Tirole, 2015. "Country Solidarity in Sovereign Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2333-2363, August.
    5. Jakob von Weizsäcker, 2011. "Eurobonds- The blue bond concept and its implications," Policy Contributions 509, Bruegel.
    6. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 879-902.
    7. Jakob von Weizsäcker, 2010. "The Blue Bond Proposal," Bruegel Policy Brief 403, Bruegel.
    8. Waltraud Schelkle, 2012. "European Fiscal Union: From Monetary Back Door to Parliamentary Main Entrance," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(01), pages 28-34, April.
    9. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chamon, Marcos & Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, 2018. "Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 114, pages 164-179.
    2. Kämmerer Jörn Axel, 2016. "How Can Eurobonds Be Legally Implemented into European Law?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 585-604, November.
    3. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    4. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Erce, Aitor & Uy, Timothy, 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies during the Euro Area Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 12228, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Jörg Bibow, 2013. "Lost at Sea: The Euro Needs a Euro Treasury," IMK Studies 35-2013, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    6. Chuck Fang & Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch, 2021. "Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(1), pages 155-196, March.
    7. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Stefan Nagel & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2018. "ECB Policies Involving Government Bond Purchases: Impact and Channels [The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(1), pages 1-44.
    8. Sebastian Blesse & Pierre C Boyer & Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Anasuya Raj, 2019. "European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 406-424, September.
    9. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & César Sosa-Padilla, 2016. "Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1383-1422.
    10. Giovanni Dosi & Marcello Minenna & Andrea Roventini & Roberto Violi, 2021. "Making the Eurozone work: a risk-sharing reform of the European Stability Mechanism," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 299(1), pages 617-657, April.
    11. Philipp Hartman & Frank Smets, 2018. "The European Central Bank’s Monetary Policy during Its First 20 Years," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 49(2 (Fall)), pages 1-146.
    12. Pablo G. Bortz, 2015. "The Greek "Rescue": Where Did the Money Go? An Analysis," Working Papers Series 29, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    13. Michael Bradley & Elisabeth de Fontenay & Irving Arturo de Lira Salvatierra & Mitu Gulati, 2018. "Pricing Sovereign Debt: Foreign versus Local Parameters," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 24(2), pages 261-297, March.
    14. Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2013. "Granger-causality in peripheral EMU public debt markets: A dynamic approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4627-4649.
    15. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch, 2022. "Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 244-273, October.
    16. Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza, 2020. "The Hausmann–Gorky Effect," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 175-195, September.
    17. Schäfer Hans-Bernd & Bigus Jochen, 2016. "Consequences of Different Eurobond Proposals," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 523-553, November.
    18. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2012. "On Creditor Seniority and Sovereign Bond Prices in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 3944, CESifo.
    19. Salomao, Juliana, 2017. "Sovereign debt renegotiation and credit default swaps," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 50-63.
    20. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1781-1823.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:12:y:2016:i:3:p:635-657:n:8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.