How to Organize Crime -super-1

Citations

Cited by:

1. Meier, Stephan & Pierce, Lamar & Vaccaro, Antonino, 2014. "Trust and In-Group Favoritism in a Culture of Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 8169, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
2. Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2013. "The Value of Connections: Evidence from the Italian-American Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 335, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
   • Mastrobuoni, Giovanni, 2014. "The Value of Connections: Evidence from the Italian-American Mafia," IZA Discussion Papers 7925, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
3. Meier, Stephan & Pierce, Lamar & Vaccaro, Antonino & La Cara, Barbara, 2016. "Trust and in-group favoritism in a culture of crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 78-92.
4. Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric, 2018. "Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 57-64.
   • Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan, 2018. "Targeting the Key Player: An Incentive-Based Approach," Working Papers halshs-01699849, HAL.
   • Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan, 2018. "Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach," Post-Print hal-01981885, HAL.
   • Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan, 2018. "Targeting the Key Player: An Incentive-Based Approach," AMSE Working Papers 1804, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
5. Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2015. "Conflict and Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1565, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
6. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2020. "A game of hide and seek in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
   • Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubinski, Marcin, 2019. "A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 53, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
   • Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubinski, 2020. "A game of hide and seek in networks," Papers 2001.03132, arXiv.org.
   • Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubiński, 2020. "A game of hide and seek in networks," Post-Print halshs-03230063, HAL.
   • Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubiński, 2020. "A game of hide and seek in networks," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03230063, HAL.
   • Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubi´nski, 2019. "A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks," Working Papers 21, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
   • Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubinski, Marcin, 2019. "A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1226, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
7. Sunghoon Hong & Myrna Wooders, 2010. "Strategic Network Interdiction," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1010, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
8. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Endogenous firms’ organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Working Papers 1524, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
   • Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2017. "Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Post-Print halshs-01657082, HAL.
   • Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2016. "Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Post-Print halshs-01418174, HAL.
   • Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2017. "Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Post-Print halshs-01657089, HAL.
   • Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Working Papers halshs-01199268, HAL.
   • Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2016. "Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Post-Print halshs-01418179, HAL.
9. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2012. "Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1007-1027, December.
   • Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2012. "Whistle-Blowing and Incentives in Firms," Post-Print hal-03399554, HAL.
10. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
    • Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2013. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firms' organization and antitrust policy," Post-Print halshs-00861216, HAL.
    • Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy," Post-Print hal-01450833, HAL.
11. Bravard, Christophe & Charroin, Liza & Touati, Corinne, 2017. "Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 62-79.
    • Christophe Bravard & Liza Charroin & Corinne Touati, 2015. "Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks," Working Papers 1519, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    • Christophe Bravard & Liza Charroin & Corinne Touati, 2017. "Optimal Design and Defense of Networks Under Link Attacks," Post-Print hal-01384998, HAL.
    • Christophe Bravard & Liza Charroin & Corinne Touati, 2016. "Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks," Post-Print halshs-01411520, HAL.
    • Christophe Bravard & Liza Charroin & Corinne Touati, 2015. "Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks," Working Papers halshs-01176928, HAL.
12. Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Roberti, 2024. "Criminal network, leniency, and market externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.
13. Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1518-1542.
    • S. Goyal & A. Vigier, 2013. "Attack, Defense and Contagion in Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1327, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defense and Contagion in Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1451, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
14. Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni Immordino, 2012. "Optimal Accomplice-Witnesses Regulation under Asymmetric Information," CSEF Working Papers 304, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
15. Dziubiński, Marcin Konrad & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2017. "How do you defend a network?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
16. Long, Iain W., 2013. "Recruitment to Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
17. C. Bravard & J. Durieu & J. Kamphorst & S. Roché & S. Sémirat, 2023. "Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(6), pages 1361-1393, December.
    • Christophe Bravard & Jacques Durieu & Jurjen Kamphorst & Sebastian Roché & Stéphan Sémirat, 2023. "Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective," Post-Print hal-04217121, HAL.
18. Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2007. "Outsourcing, information leakage, and consulting firms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 269-289, March.
    • Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2008. "Outsourcing, Information Leakage and Consulting Firms," Working Papers 08-7, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
19. Cerdeiro, Diego A. & Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2017. "Individual security, contagion, and network design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 182-226.
20. B. Hoyer, 2012. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
21. Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2013. "Network design and defence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 30-43.
22. Levine, Emma E. & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 2015. "Prosocial lies: When deception breeds trust," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 88-106.
23. D’Hernoncourt, Johanna & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2012. "The not so dark side of trust: Does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 97-121.
    • Johanna D'Hernoncourt & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "The not so dark side of trust: does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?," Working Papers CEB 08-030, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Johanna D'Hernoncourt & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2012. "The not so dark side of trust: Does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/98287, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
24. Maria Bigoni & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Chloé Le Coq & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 663-689.
    • Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloe & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Working Paper Series 859, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 11 Dec 2014.
    • Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2014. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2014:2, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
25. Mastrobuoni Giovanni & Patacchini Eleonora, 2012. "Organized Crime Networks: an Application of Network Analysis Techniques to the American Mafia," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-43, September.
26. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Bigoni, Maria, 2012. "Trust and Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 9002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
27. Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal, 2014. "How to Defend a Network?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1450, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
28. Gamba, Astrid & Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2018. "Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 79-88.
    • Astrid Gamba & Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo, 2016. "Corruption, Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law," CSEF Working Papers 446, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
29. Carlos Ponce & Flavia Roldán, 2016. "How a cartel operates: evidence from Graphite Electrode cartel from a social network perspective," Documentos de Investigación 113, Universidad ORT Uruguay. Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales.
30. Acemoglu, Daron & Malekian, Azarakhsh & Ozdaglar, Asu, 2016. "Network security and contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 536-585.
    • Daron Acemoglu & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2013. "Network Security and Contagion," NBER Working Papers 19174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Daron Acemoglu & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asuman E. Ozdaglar, 2013. "Network Security and Contagion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000797, David K. Levine.
31. Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Roberti, 2018. "Optimal Leniency and the Organization Design of Group Delinquency," CSEF Working Papers 503, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
32. Iain W. Long, 2017. "The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organized Crime," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(5), pages 541-576, September.
    • Long, Iain W., 2014. "The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2014/8, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
33. Diego Cerdeiro & Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal, 2015. "Contagion Risk and Network Design," Working Papers 2015.56, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Cerdeiro, Diego & Dziubinski, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2015. "Contagion Risk and Network Design," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 206416, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Diego Cerdeiro & Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal, 2015. "Contagion Risk and Network Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1547, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
34. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Xavier Venel, 2019. "Diffusion in countably infinite networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 19017, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Xavier Venel, 2019. "Diffusion in countably infinite networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02340011, HAL.
    • Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Xavier Venel, 2019. "Diffusion in countably infinite networks," Post-Print halshs-02340011, HAL.
35. Bernales, Alejandro & Beuermann, Diether W. & Cumming, Douglas & Olid, Christian, 2023. "Blue-Collar Crime and Finance," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    • Bernales, Alejandro & Beuermann, Diether & Cumming, Douglas & Olid, Christian, 2022. "Blue-Collar Crime and Finance," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 9678, Inter-American Development Bank.
36. Paolo Buccirossi & Giovanni Immordino & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Whistleblower rewards, false reports, and corporate fraud," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 411-431, June.
    • Paolo Buccirossi & Giovanni Immordino & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2017. "Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud," CSEF Working Papers 477, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 02 Sep 2017.
    • Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Buccirossi, Paolo & Immordino, Giovanni, 2017. "Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud," CEPR Discussion Papers 12260, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Buccirossi, Paolo & Immordino, Giovanni & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2017. "Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud," SITE Working Paper Series 42, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 29 Aug 2017.
37. Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore & Roberti, Paolo, 2020. "Optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
38. María C. Avramovich, 2020. "The Welfare Implications of the Meeting Design of a Cartel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(1), pages 59-83, August.
39. Ferrali, Romain, 2020. "Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 319-353.
40. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Eleonora Patacchini, 2010. "Understanding Organized Crime Networks: Evidence Based on Federal Bureau of Narcotics Secret Files on American Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 152, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
41. Charles H. Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2018. "The Onset, Spread, and Prevention of Mass Atrocities: Perspectives from Network Models," HiCN Working Papers 284, Households in Conflict Network.
    • Charles H. Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2018. "The Onset, Spread, and Prevention of Mass Atrocities:Perspectives from Network Models," Working Papers 1810, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
42. Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Roberti, 2018. "Criminal Networks, Market Externalities and Optimal Leniency," CSEF Working Papers 519, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
43. Goyal, S., 2016. "Networks and Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1652, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
44. McBride, Michael & Hewitt, David, 2013. "The enemy you can’t see: An investigation of the disruption of dark networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 32-50.
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45. Xiang, Wang, 2020. "Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
46. Mehmet Bac, 2023. "Transnational crimes: how nations should cooperate and why they don't," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(4), pages 860-899, October.
47. DeAngelo, Gregory, 2012. "Making space for crime: A spatial analysis of criminal competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 42-51.
48. Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng, 2017. "Criminal network formation and optimal detection policy: The role of cascade of detection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 43-63.
49. Ken Yahagi, 2019. "Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 351-363, December.
50. Schram, Peter, 2021. "Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 240-257.
51. Michele Battisti & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Roberto Musotto, 2022. "Organizing Crime: an Empirical Analysis of the Sicilian Mafia," Papers 2205.02310, arXiv.org.
52. Luís Cabral, 2005. "Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 199-206, December.