Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105018
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- Kayas, Oliver G., 2023. "Workplace surveillance: A systematic review, integrative framework, and research agenda," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Monitoring; Bribery; Network;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
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