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Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
  2. Alexander Matros, 2007. "Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players," Working Paper 323, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2008.
  3. James Lake & Maia K. Linask, 2013. "The near-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Departmental Working Papers 1305, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  4. Temel, Tugrul, 2011. "Industrial policy, collective action, and the direction of technological change," MPRA Paper 31917, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. James Lake & Maia Linask, 2015. "Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 211-238, December.
  6. Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
  7. Hiroyuki Sano, 2014. "Reciprocal rent-seeking contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 575-596, March.
  8. Robert Michaels, 1988. "The design of rent-seeking competitions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 17-29, January.
  9. Adarkwah Yaw Antwi & John Adams, 2003. "Rent-seeking Behaviour and its Economic Costs in Urban Land Transactions in Accra, Ghana," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(10), pages 2083-2098, September.
  10. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 329-335, March.
  11. T. Guse & B. Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 323-352, December.
  12. John Morgan & Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Endogenous entry in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 435-463, October.
  13. Carpenter, Jeffrey, 2021. "The shape of warm glow: Field experimental evidence from a fundraiser," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 555-574.
  14. Roger Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 249-263, January.
  15. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2017. "Using raffles to fund public goods: Lessons from a field experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 30-38.
  16. Martin Grossmann, 2021. "Asymmetric Opportunities After an Unsuccessful Sports Career," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(5), pages 587-612, June.
  17. XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2014. "Contests with a Prize Externality and Stochastic Entry," Working Papers 14-19, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  18. William F. Shughart II, 1999. "The Reformer’s Dilemma," Public Finance Review, , vol. 27(5), pages 561-565, September.
  19. Grossmann, Martin & Dietl, Helmut, 2015. "Heterogeneous outside options in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 280-287.
  20. Hiroyuki Sano, 2009. "Imitative Learning in Tullock Contests: Does Overdissipation Prevail in the Long Run?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 365-383, September.
  21. Cugno, Franco & Ferrero, Mario, 2004. "Competition among volunteers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 637-654, September.
  22. Richard Higgins & William Shughart & Robert Tollison, 1985. "Efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 247-258, January.
  23. John Morgan & Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Endogenous entry in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 435-463, October.
  24. Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, March.
  25. J. Smith & Shlomo Weber, 1989. "Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 153-166, May.
  26. Petros G. Sekeris & Kevin Siqueira, 2021. "Payoff-Improving Competition: Games with Negative Externalities," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(3), pages 455-474, May.
  27. William Corcoran & Gordon Karels, 1985. "Efficient rents 1 rent-seeking behavior in the long-run," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 227-246, January.
  28. S. Keith Berry, 2006. "Firm Incentives for Invention Prizes with Multiple Winners," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 83-95, Winter.
  29. Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Efficient rents 3 back to the bog," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 259-263, January.
  30. Lim, Wooyoung & Matros, Alexander, 2009. "Contests with a stochastic number of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 584-597, November.
  31. Xiuqin Yang & Feng Liu & Hua Wang, 2023. "Complex Dynamic Analysis for a Rent-Seeking Game with Political Competition and Policymaker Costs," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-18, November.
  32. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2000. "Does jury bias matter?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 315-328, September.
  33. Jia, Hao & Sun, Ching-jen, 2021. "The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  34. Aycinena, Diego & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
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