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Rent-seeking Behaviour and its Economic Costs in Urban Land Transactions in Accra, Ghana

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  • Adarkwah Yaw Antwi

    (School of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of Wolverhampton, Wulfruna Street, Wolverhampton, WV1 1SB, UK, a.antwi@wlv.ac.uk.)

  • John Adams

    (Department of Economics, Napier University, Sighthill Campus, Edinburgh, EH11 4BN, UK, J.Adams@napier.ac.uk.)

Abstract

The existing body of knowledge attributes to informal land transactions in sub-Saharan African cities observed problems in city neighbourhoods. Substantial resources, often backed by donor agencies, are therefore being spent in revamping bureaux and governmental bodies in a bid to solve the problems. This paper examines the economic impacts of this aspect of market intervention. Employing insights from rent-seeking theory, it estimates costs brought to bear on agents by government agencies' involvement in the urban land market of Accra, Ghana. The sum of these wasteful diversions of resources is found to explain a great deal of the haphazard developments that have come to characterise many neighbourhoods in the city. Market-led regulation emerges as the needed focus of future land policy and management strategy. Towards this, the paper calls for the removal of existing unwarranted market interventions and the reorganisation of responsible bureaux in ways that would induce them to operate efficiently.

Suggested Citation

  • Adarkwah Yaw Antwi & John Adams, 2003. "Rent-seeking Behaviour and its Economic Costs in Urban Land Transactions in Accra, Ghana," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(10), pages 2083-2098, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:40:y:2003:i:10:p:2083-2098
    DOI: 10.1080/0042098032000116121
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Harris Selod & Lara Tobin, 2018. "The spatial sorting of informal dwellers in cities in developing countries: Theory and evidence," Working Papers halshs-01703178, HAL.
    2. Alexander Osei-Owusu & Anders Henten, 2017. "The land rental system and diffusion of telecom infrastructure in Ghana: an institutional and transaction economics approach," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 7(2), pages 183-202, August.

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