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Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study
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Cited by:
- Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2009.
"Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 181-221.
- Heinemann, Frank & Nagel, Rosemarie & Ockenfels, Peter, 2004. "Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 6, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004. "Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games," Economics Working Papers 804, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004. "Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1364, CESifo.
- Aviad Heifetz & Willemien Kets, 2013. "Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naiveté," Discussion Papers 1573, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bannier, Christina E., 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/29, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Baeriswyl Romain & Cornand Camille, 2016.
"The Predominant Role of Signal Precision in Experimental Beauty Contests,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 267-301, January.
- Camille Cornand & Romain Baeriswyl, 2014. "The predominant role of signal precision in experimental beauty contest," Working Papers halshs-01098772, HAL.
- Camille Cornand & Romain Baeriswyl, 2016. "The predominant role of signals’ precision in experimental beauty contest," Post-Print halshs-01303675, HAL.
- Camille Cornand & Romain Baeriswyl, 2016. "The predominant role of signals’ precision in experimental beauty contest," Post-Print halshs-01303673, HAL.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2016. "The predominant role of signal precision in experimental beauty contest," Post-Print halshs-01236276, HAL.
- Camille Cornand & Romain Baeriswyl, 2014. "The predominant role of signal precision in experimental beauty contests," Working Papers 1441, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Ho, Teck H. & Camerer, Colin F. & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2007. "Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 177-198, March.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014.
"Reducing Overreaction To Central Banks' Disclosures: Theory And Experiment,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1087-1126, August.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2011. "Reducing overreaction to central banks’ disclosures : theory and experiment," Working Papers 1141, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2012. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures : theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-00954650, HAL.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2012. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures : theory and experiment," Working Papers halshs-00657943, HAL.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2012. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures : theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-00954641, HAL.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2012. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures : theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-00954625, HAL.
- Dr. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2012. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures:theory and experiment," Working Papers 2012-08, Swiss National Bank.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2013. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures : theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-00954621, HAL.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2011. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures : theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-00954630, HAL.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2011. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures : theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-00954652, HAL.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2012. "Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures : theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-00954643, HAL.
- Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014. "Reducing overreaction to central banks disclosure: theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-00940996, HAL.
- Camille Cornand, 2006.
"Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study,"
Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 797-817, November.
- Camille Cornand, 2004. "Speculative Attack and Informational Structure: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0407, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Camille Cornand, 2008. "Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study," Post-Print hal-00279185, HAL.
- Camille Cornand, 2006. "Speculative Attack and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study," Post-Print halshs-00360088, HAL.
- Camille Cornand, 2004. "Speculative Attack and Informational Structure: An Experimental Study," Post-Print halshs-00180118, HAL.
- Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2014.
"Depth of reasoning and higher order beliefs,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 108-122.
- Tomasz Strzalecki, "undated". "Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs," Working Paper 8334, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2014. "Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs," Scholarly Articles 14397608, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri & Bjoern Hartig & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, "undated".
"To Share or Not to Share: An Experiment on Information Transmission in Networks,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
20/08, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri & Bjoern Hartig & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2020. "To Share or Not to Share: An Experiment on Information Transmission in Networks," Working Papers 2020-06, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Christina E. Bannier, 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," Game Theory and Information 0309006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Friedel Bolle & Jörg Spiller, 2021. "Cooperation against all predictions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 904-924, July.
- Külpmann, Philipp & Khantadze, Davit, 2016.
"Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment,"
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
567, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Philipp Külpmann & Davit Khantadze, 2016. "Identifying the Reasons for Coordination Failure in a Laboratory Experiment," 2016 Papers pkl168, Job Market Papers.
- Antonio Cabrales & Michalis Drouvelis & Zeynep Gurguy & Indrajit Ray, 2017.
"Transparency is Overrated: Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
6781, CESifo.
- Gurguc, Zeynep & Drouvelis, Michalis & Ray, Indrajit, 2017. "Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information," CEPR Discussion Papers 12353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Louis, Philippos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "Coordination with preferences over the coalition size," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 105-123.
- Boun My, Kene & Cornand, Camille & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2021.
"Public information and the concern for coordination,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
- Kene Boun My & Camille Cornand & Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, 2021. "Public information and the concern for coordination," Post-Print hal-03468870, HAL.
- Beggs Alan, 2009.
"Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-30, September.
- Alan Beggs, 2005. "Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions," Economics Series Working Papers 232, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Helland, Leif & Iachan, Felipe S. & Juelsrud, Ragnar E. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2021. "Information quality and regime change: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 538-554.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006.
"The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Working Papers 0502, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print halshs-00137469, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre ALLEGRET & Camille CORNAND, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency : the case of speculative attacks," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print halshs-00180086, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency : The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print hal-00279027, HAL.
- Morgan, John, 2004. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt81m0r0jj, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Regina M. Anctil & John Dickhaut & Chandra Kanodia & Brian Shapiro, 2004. "Information Transparency and Coordination Failure: Theory and Experiment," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 159-195, May.
- Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
- Teck H Ho & Colin Camerer & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2003. "Functional EWA: A one-parameter theory of learning in games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000514, David K. Levine.
- Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Morgan, John, 2010.
"Clock games: Theory and experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 532-550, March.
- Morgan, John, 2004. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt81m0r0jj, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Brunnermeier, Markus K & Morgan, John, 2006. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9c11m09n, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Markus K Brunnermeier & John Morgan, 2004. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000401, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Kene Boun My & Camille Cornand & Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, 2017. "Public information and the concern for coordination," Working Papers halshs-01485677, HAL.
- Olga Shurchkov, 2013. "Coordination and learning in dynamic global games: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(3), pages 313-334, September.
- Ioannou, Christos A. & Makris, Miltiadis, 2017. "An experimental investigation of Poisson Coordination games," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1506, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- John Van Huyck & Ajalavat Viriyavipart & Alexander L. Brown, 2018. "When less information is good enough: experiments with global stag hunt games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 527-548, September.
- George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tracy Xiao Liu, 2018. "All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 247-271, March.
- Alexander Elbittar & Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz, 2014.
"Network Structure In A Link Formation Game: An Experimental Study,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(4), pages 1341-1363, October.
- Alexander Elbittar & Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz, 2007. "Network Structure in a Link-formation Game: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001708, David K. Levine.
- Alexander Elbittar & Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz, 2008. "Network Structure in a Link-formation Game: An Experimental Study," Documentos de Trabajo 331, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Alexander Elbittar & Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz, 2007. "Network Structure in a Link-formation Game: An Experimental Study," Working Papers DTE 405, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Philip J. Grossman & Youngseok Park & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A. Rud, 2019. "Gender differences in an endogenous timing conflict game," Working Papers 141, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2007.
"The E-Mail Game Revisited — Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 323-339.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2002. "The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning," Vienna Economics Papers 0211, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008.
"Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2004. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," CESifo Working Paper Series 1353, CESifo.
- Camille Cornand, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Post-Print halshs-00137529, HAL.
- Cornand, Camille & Heinemann, Frank, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 158, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Camille Cornand, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Post-Print halshs-00137519, HAL.
- Camille Cornand, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Post-Print halshs-00137532, HAL.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Post-Print hal-00279244, HAL.
- Carlos Corona & Lin Nan & Gaoqing Zhang, 2019. "The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(5), pages 1161-1200, December.
- Brindisi, Francesco & Çelen, Boğaçhan & Hyndman, Kyle, 2014. "The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 264-281.
- Fabrizio Germano, 2006.
"On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 561-581, November.
- Fabrizio Germano, 2003. "On Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form Games," Working Papers 42, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Fabrizio Germano, 2003. "On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games," Economics Working Papers 669, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2020. "Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 534-553.
- Christos A. Ioannou & Miltiadis Makris, 2019.
"An Experimental Study Of Uncertainty In Coordination Games,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(2), pages 751-799, May.
- Christos A. Ioannou & Miltiadis Makris, 2019. "An Experimental Study Of Uncertainty In Coordination Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03268470, HAL.
- Christos A. Ioannou & Miltiadis Makris, 2019. "An Experimental Study Of Uncertainty In Coordination Games," Post-Print hal-03268470, HAL.
- Hong Qu, 2013. "How Do Market Prices and Cheap Talk Affect Coordination?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 1221-1260, December.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2007.
"The E-Mail Game Revisited — Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 323-339.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2002. "The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning," Vienna Economics Papers vie0211, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Park, Youngseok & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A. & Grossman, Philip J., 2021.
"An endogenous-timing conflict game,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 592-607.
- Youngseok Park & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A. Rud & Philip J. Grossman, 2020. "An endogenous-timing conflict game," Monash Economics Working Papers 13-20, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Heinemann, Frank, 2024. "An experimental test of the global-game selection in coordination games with asymmetric players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 632-656.
- Kene Boun My & Camille Cornand & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, 2017.
"Speculation rather than enterprise? Keynes’ beauty contest revisited in theory and experiment,"
Working Papers of BETA
2017-13, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Kene Boun My & Camille Cornand & Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, 2017. "Speculation rather than enterprise? Keynes' beauty contest revisited in theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-01569164, HAL.
- Kene Boun My & Camille Cornand & Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, 2017. "Speculation rather than enterprise? Keynes' beauty contest revisited in theory and experiment," Post-Print halshs-01656779, HAL.
- Kene Boun My & Camille Cornand & Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, 2017. "Speculation Rather than Enterprise ? Keyness Beauty Contest Revisited in Theory and Experiment," Post-Print hal-02510843, HAL.
- Peter Ockenfels & Rosemarie Nagel & Frank Heinemann, 2002.
"Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp416, Financial Markets Group.
- Heinemann, Frank & Nagel, Rosemarie & Ockenfels, Peter, 2002. "Speculative attacks and financial architecture: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24935, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Sanchez Villalba, Miguel, 2017. "Global Inspection Games (GIG) in the laboratory," MPRA Paper 80715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Heinemann, Frank & Moradi, Homayoon, 2018. "Sunspots in Global Games: Theory and Experiment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 135, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Bolle, Friedel, 2017. "A behavioral theory of equilibrium selection," Discussion Papers 392, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
- Novarese, Marco & Chelini, Chiara & Spada, Anna & Ambrosino, Angela & Trigona, Carla, 2010. "An Experimental Investigation on Learning and Context Effects," MPRA Paper 27807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schade, Christian & Schroeder, Andreas & Krause, Kai Oliver, 2010. "Coordination after gains and losses: Is prospect theory’s value function predictive for games?," Structural Change in Agriculture/Strukturwandel im Agrarsektor (SiAg) Working Papers 59524, Humboldt University Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Christian Hellwig, 2002. "Imperfect Common Knowledge of Preferences in Global Coordination Games (October 2002)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 211, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Steven J. Bosworth, 2017. "The importance of higher-order beliefs to successful coordination," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(1), pages 237-258, March.
- repec:stn:sotoec:1401 is not listed on IDEAS
- Thomas Neumann & Bodo Vogt, 2009. "Do Players’ Beliefs or Risk Attitudes Determine The Equilibrium Selections in 2x2 Coordination Games?," FEMM Working Papers 09024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Arifovic, Jasmina & Hua Jiang, Janet & Xu, Yiping, 2013. "Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2446-2465.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gurguc, Zeynep & Ray, Indrajit, 2018. "Do we need to listen to all stakeholders?: communicating in a coordination game with private information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2018/23, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Anna Bayona & Oana Peia & Razvan Vlahu, 2023. "Credit Ratings and Investments," Working Papers 776, DNB.