IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/hhs/sifrwp/0041.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Chen, Tai-Yuan & Zhang, Guochang & Zhou, Yi, 2018. "Enforceability of non-compete covenants, discretionary investments, and financial reporting practices: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 41-60.
  2. Xu, Jin & Yang, Jun, 2016. "Golden hellos: Signing bonuses for new top executives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 175-195.
  3. Florian S. Peters & Alexander F. Wagner, 2014. "The Executive Turnover Risk Premium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(4), pages 1529-1563, August.
  4. Richard J. Gentry & Joseph S. Harrison & Timothy J. Quigley & Steven Boivie, 2021. "A database of CEO turnover and dismissal in S&P 1500 firms, 2000–2018," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5), pages 968-991, May.
  5. Zenan Wu & Xi Weng, 2018. "Managerial turnover and entrenchment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 742-771, October.
  6. Jiang, Yi, 2017. "Managerial incentives in the presence of golden handshakes," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 177-183.
  7. Ying L. Compton & Angela K. Gore & Susan L. Kulp, 2017. "Compensation design and political risk: the case of city managers," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 109-140, March.
  8. Mansi, Sattar A. & Wald, John K. & Zhang, Andrew (Jianzhong), 2016. "Severance agreements and the cost of debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 426-444.
  9. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2021. "Performance-Induced CEO Turnover [The “Wall Street Walk” and shareholder activism: Exit as a form of voice]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(2), pages 569-617.
  10. George Alexandridis & John A. Doukas & Christos P. Mavis, 2019. "Does Firing a CEO Pay Off?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 3-43, March.
  11. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane, 2012. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 43144, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  12. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 195-234, February.
  13. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
  14. Hongjin Zhu & Yue Pan & Jiaping Qiu & Jinli Xiao, 2022. "Hometown Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Corporations: Evidence from CEO Dismissals and Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 176(2), pages 283-310, March.
  15. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2010. "Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks," CESifo Working Paper Series 3028, CESifo.
  16. Jacqueline Christensen & Pamela Kent & Tom Smith, 2016. "The decision to outsource risk management services," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 56(4), pages 985-1015, December.
  17. Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2019. "Paid to Quit," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 387-406, December.
  18. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2gg54vdji291pb220pomk85ev8 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Fee, C. Edward & Hadlock, Charles J. & Pierce, Joshua R., 2018. "New evidence on managerial labor markets: An analysis of CEO retreads," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 428-441.
  20. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
  21. Chen, Jie & De Cesari, Amedeo & Hill, Paula & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2018. "Initial compensation contracts for new executives and financial distress risk: An empirical investigation of UK firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 292-313.
  22. Kaplan, Steven N. & Minton, Bernadette A., 2006. "How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs," Working Paper Series 2006-7, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  23. Heitzman, Shane, 2011. "Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 251-271.
  24. Brown, Kareen & Jha, Ranjini & Pacharn, Parunchana, 2015. "Ex ante CEO severance pay and risk-taking in the financial services sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-126.
  25. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Low, Angie & Stulz, René M., 2010. "Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 12-32, July.
  26. Dahiya, Sandeep & Yermack, David, 2008. "You can't take it with you: Sunset provisions for equity compensation when managers retire, resign, or die," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 499-511, December.
  27. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
  28. Jonathan Taglialatela & Ivan Miroshnychenko & Roberto Barontini & Francesco Testa, 2024. "Talk or walk? The board of directors and firm environmental strategies," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 2890-2910, May.
  29. Laux, Volker, 2012. "Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 513-526.
  30. Ales Cornanic & Jiri Novak & Jan Sarapatka, 2018. "Religion, Corporate Governance, and Executive Compensation," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 68(1), pages 34-70, February.
  31. Novak, Jiri & Bilinski, Pawel, 2018. "Social stigma and executive compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 169-184.
  32. Rydqvist, Kristian, 2010. "Tax Arbitrage with Risk and Effort Aversion - Swedish Lottery Bonds 1970-1990," SIFR Research Report Series 70, Institute for Financial Research.
  33. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2017. "Severance agreements, incentives and CEO dismissal," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 440-447.
  34. Van Dalsem, Shane, 2010. "Determinants of CEO severance contracts and their components and the effects of severance contracts on executive turnover," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 257-272, July.
  35. Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2022. "Fair and Square: A Retention Model of Managerial Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3604-3624, May.
  36. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
  37. Darren Bernard & Weili Ge & Dawn Matsumoto & Sara Toynbee, 2021. "Implied Tradeoffs of Chief Financial Officer Accounting Expertise: Evidence from Firm-Manager Matching," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5776-5799, September.
  38. Eckbo, B. Espen & Thorburn, Karin S. & Wang, Wei, 2016. "How costly is corporate bankruptcy for the CEO?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 210-229.
  39. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  40. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud, 2013. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Working Papers hal-03470530, HAL.
  41. Daniel Ferreira & Emanuel Ornelas & John L. Turner, 2015. "Unbundling Ownership and Control," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 1-21, March.
  42. John Wald & Sattar Mansi & Anh Nguyen, 2012. "Golden Parachutes, Incentives, and the Cost of Debt," Working Papers 0008, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio.
  43. Gillan, Stuart L. & Nguyen, Nga Q., 2016. "Incentives, termination payments, and CEO contracting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 445-465.
  44. Eckbo, B. Espen, 2009. "Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 149-178, February.
  45. P. Raghavendra Rau & Jin Xu, 2013. "How Do Ex Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 631-671, June.
  46. Swarnodeep HomRoy, 2016. "Was Adam Smith Right? Evidence of Compensating Differential in CEO Pay," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 84(1), pages 1-24, January.
  47. Darko Tipuric & Danica Bakotic & Marina Lovrincevic, 2013. "Exploring The Link Between Executive Compensation Package And Executives' Pay Satisfaction In Croatian Companies: An Empirical Study," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 9(2), pages 7-16.
  48. David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris, 2022. "How did the Sarbanes–Oxley Act affect managerial incentives? Evidence from corporate acquisitions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 1395-1450, May.
  49. Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Garcia, Justin R. & Wernerfelt, Nils & Lum, J. Koji & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2010. "Dopamine and Risk Preferences in Different Domains," Working Paper Series rwp10-012, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  50. Wallace Davidson & Biao Xie & Weihong Xu & Yixi Ning, 2007. "The influence of executive age, career horizon and incentives on pre-turnover earnings management," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(1), pages 45-60, March.
  51. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.
  52. Van Wesep, Edward D. & Wang, Sean, 2014. "The prevention of excess managerial risk taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 579-593.
  53. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2gg54vdji291pb220pomk85ev8 is not listed on IDEAS
  54. Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc, 2011. "Managerial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1068-1077, September.
  55. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2009. "Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(3), pages 486-496, June.
  56. Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2013. "CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 659-674.
  57. Sundaram, Rangarajan K. & Yermack, David, 2006. "Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation," SIFR Research Report Series 43, Institute for Financial Research.
  58. Isabelle Allemand, 2009. "Analyse des liens entre les départs de dirigeants suite à une mauvaise performance et la création de valeur: une étude menée en France," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(2), pages 69-90, June.
  59. Stein, Luke C.D. & Zhao, Hong, 2019. "Independent executive directors: How distraction affects their advisory and monitoring roles," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 199-223.
  60. Maziarz Mariusz, 2019. "A disequilibrium mechanism: When managerial decisions cause macroeconomic instability," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 79-92, March.
  61. repec:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2017:i:5:p:1805-1846. is not listed on IDEAS
  62. Arja Jolkkonen & Pertti Koistinen & Arja Kurvinen & Liudmila Lipiäinen & Tapio Nummi & Pekka Virtanen, 2018. "Labour Market Attachment Following Major Workforce Downsizings: A Comparison of Displaced and Retained Workers," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 32(6), pages 992-1010, December.
  63. Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
  64. Elsaid, Eahab & Davidson III, Wallace N., 2009. "What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-447, May.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.