Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Citations

Cited by:

1. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
2. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2012. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54250, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
3. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005.
   • Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics.
4. Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
   • Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
   • Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
5. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 469-482, August.
   • Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1237, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 15, pages 331-343, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
7. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0410001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000577, UCLA Department of Economics.
8. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000664, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
9. Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 202-217, May.
   • Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Lippert, Steffen, 2004. "Networks of Relations," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 570, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 04 Jun 2010.
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10. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    • Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.
11. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
    • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000257, David K. Levine.
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0661, Econometric Society.
    • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org.
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000.
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department.
    • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine.
12. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
    • Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
13. Fainmesser, Itay P. & Goldberg, David A., 2018. "Cooperation in partly observable networked markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 220-237.
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15. Partha Gangopadhyay & Mustafa Rahman & Nasser Elkanj, 2011. "Quality Traps in Localized Competition," Modern Applied Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 5(5), pages 1-3, October.
16. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2015. "Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
17. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
18. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
19. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
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    • Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2007. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," 2007 Meeting Papers 751, Society for Economic Dynamics.
20. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
21. Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(4), pages 1.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Game Theory and Information 0203003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
22. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6102 is not listed on IDEAS
23. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
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24. Joyee Deb & Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee, 2015. "Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1995, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
25. Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
26. Markus Kinateder, 2006. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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27. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 2003. "Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 227-250, August.
28. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2004. "Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(4), pages 383-411, April.
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