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Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring

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  • Kurt Annen

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  • Kurt Annen, 2011. "Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 269-285, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:269-285
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0493-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kurt Annen, 2001. "Inclusive and Exclusive Social Capital in the Small-Firm Sector in Developing Countries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 319-330, June.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    3. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    4. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
    5. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 581-593.
    6. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    7. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 2003. "Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 227-250, August.
    8. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Rosa L. Matzkin & Daniel L. McFadden & James C. Moore & Nicholas C. Yann (ed.), Rationality and Equilibrium, pages 21-55, Springer.
    10. Annen, Kurt, 2003. "Social capital, inclusive networks, and economic performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 449-463, April.
    11. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
    12. Khalid Nadvi, 1999. "Shifting Ties: Social Networks in the Surgical Instrument Cluster of Sialkot, Pakistan," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 30(1), pages 141-175, January.
    13. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-950, October.
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