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Market signaling with grades

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kaniel, Ron & Orlov, Dmitry, 2020. "Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects," CEPR Discussion Papers 14586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2022. "Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1225-1260, May.
  3. Luigi Brighi & Marcello D'Amato, 2020. "Investment in early education and job market signaling," Department of Economics (DEMB) 0179, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Department of Economics "Marco Biagi".
  4. Qiaochu Wang & Yan Huang & Stefanus Jasin & Param Vir Singh, 2023. "Algorithmic Transparency with Strategic Users," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2297-2317, April.
  5. Hedlund, Jonas, 2024. "Signaling through Bayesian persuasion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 15-27.
  6. Sharon Belenzon & Aaron K. Chatterji & Brendan Daley, 2020. "Choosing Between Growth and Glory," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2050-2074, May.
  7. Gea M. Lee & Seung Han Yoo, 2013. "Unobserved Investment, Signaling, and Welfare," Discussion Paper Series 1301, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, revised 2017.
  8. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Sloof, Randolph, 2022. "The political economy of fiscal transparency and independent fiscal councils," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
  9. Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
  10. Daniel Quigley & Ansgar Walther, 2024. "Inside and Outside Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(4), pages 2667-2714, August.
  11. Ishida, Junichiro & Suen, Wing, 2024. "Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 449-459.
  12. Francesc Dilmé & Fei Li, 2016. "Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 57-82, February.
  13. Brendan Daley & Brett Green & Victoria Vanasco, 2016. "Designing securities for scrutiny," Economics Working Papers 1818, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2021.
  14. Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
  15. Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2023. "Signaling through tests," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 25-34.
  16. Pablo Kurlat & Florian Scheuer, 2021. "Signalling to Experts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 800-850.
  17. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021. "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 869-908, October.
  18. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
  19. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  20. Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2023. "A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 1-43, February.
  21. David Besanko & Avner A. Kreps & Clair Yang, 2024. "Rules for the rulemakers: asymmetric information and the political economy of benefit-cost analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 1-51, August.
  22. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2018. "Signaling versus costly information acquisition," Discussion Papers 2018/11, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  24. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
  25. Sadowski, Philipp, 2016. "Overeagerness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 114-125.
  26. Dilmé, Francesc, 2017. "Noisy signaling in discrete time," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 13-25.
  27. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 50-57.
  28. Philippe Mahenc & Alexandre Volle, 2021. "Price Signaling and Quality Monitoring in Markets for Credence Goods," Working Papers hal-03098440, HAL.
  29. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
  30. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  31. Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana Sisak, 2022. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 529-580, February.
  32. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro & Suen, Wing, 2024. "Signaling under double-crossing preferences: The case of discrete types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  33. Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2021. "Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  34. Brendan Daley & Brett Green & Victoria Vanasco, 2020. "Securitization, Ratings, and Credit Supply," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 1037-1082, April.
  35. Philippe Mahenc & Alexandre Volle, 2021. "Price Signaling and Quality Monitoring in Markets for Credence Goods," CEE-M Working Papers hal-03098440, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
  36. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Small Noise in Signaling Selects Pooling on Minimum Signal," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 101, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
  37. Sharon Belenzon & Aaron K. Chatterji & Brendan Daley, 2017. "Eponymous Entrepreneurs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1638-1655, June.
  38. Tom Lane & Minghai Zhou, 2022. "Failure of unravelling theory? A natural field experiment on voluntary quality disclosure," Discussion Papers 2022-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  39. Takaaki Hamada, 2023. "Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 570-614, June.
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