Cheap talk in games with incomplete information

Citations

Cited by:

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6. Francisco Silva, 2016. "Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit?," Documentos de Trabajo 477, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
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13. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
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20. Marie Laclau & Péter Vida & Helmuts Azacis, 2024. "Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case," THEMA Working Papers 2024-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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