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Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?

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  • Nathalie Greenan
  • Marc-Arthur Diaye
  • Patricia Crifo

Abstract

[fre] Cet article propose une théorie des entretiens d ’ évaluation alternative à celle d ’ une mesure ex post de la performance lorsque l ’ autonomie se développe , les salaires restant peu flexibles . Notre modèle d ’ agence avec travail en équipe met en évidence que de fortes interdépendances horizontales et une technologie super-modulaire ne garantissent pas la coordination vers l ’ équilibre Pareto-optimal . Le coût des incitations monétaires à la coordination étant croissant avec ces caractéristiques , le principal a intérêt à développer un système moins onéreux , les entretiens d ’ évaluation , ceux-ci générant ex ante un signal pour convaincre les travailleurs de l ’ existence d ’ un esprit d ’ équipe . Les prédictions de ce modèle sont testées empiriquement à partir des données de l ’ enquête Changement Organisationnel et Informatisation de 1997 . Les entretiens d ’ évaluation semblent être déterminés plus par la nature collective du travail que par le degré d ’ autonomie et ne s ’ accompagnent pas d ’ un gain monétaire mais d ’ un système de croyances sur le travail . Mots-clés : travail en équipe , aléa moral , coopération , incitations monétaires et non monétaires , entretien annuel [eng] This paper puts forward an alternative evaluation interview theory to the one of an ex post performance measurement when autonomy increases , since wages remain fairly rigid . Our agency model with teamwork shows that strong horizontal interdependence and super-modularity do not ensure coordination to reach Pareto-optimal equilibrium . The cost of monetary incentives for coordination increases as a function of these characteristics , which means that it is in the principal ’ s interest to develop a less costly system , such as individual evaluation interviews , since they generate an ex ante signal to convince workers of the existence of a team spirit . The model predictions were tested empirically using the data from the 1997 Computerisation and Organisational Change Survey . Individual evaluation interviews seem to be determined more by the degree of teamwork than by the degree of autonomy and they are not associated with monetary gains , but rather a belief system relating to work

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  • Nathalie Greenan & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Patricia Crifo, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 27-55.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_164_3_7353
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2004.7353
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2004.7353
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    Cited by:

    1. Crifo, Patricia, 2003. "La modélisation du changement organisationnel : déterminants et conséquences sur le marché du travail," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 79(3), pages 349-365, Septembre.
    2. Nathalie Greenan & Emmanuelle Walkowiak, 2005. "Informatique, organisation du travail et interactions sociales," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 387(1), pages 35-63.
    3. Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan & Michal W. Urdanivia, 2008. "Subjective Evaluation of Performance and Evaluation Interview: Empirical Evidence from France," NBER Chapters, in: The Analysis of Firms and Employees: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, pages 107-131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Martine Gadille & François Jaujard, 2011. "L'hybridation des modèles d'évaluation de la performance : implications organisationnelles et individuelles," Post-Print emse-00658004, HAL.
    5. Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan & Michal Urdanivia, 2007. "Subjective Evaluation of Performance Through Individual Evaluation Interview: Empirical evidence from France," NBER Working Papers 12979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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