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Multitask agency problems: Focus and task clustering

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Cited by:

  1. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J., 2011. "Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1094-1108.
  2. Mathilde Maurel & Thomas Pernet-Coudrier, 2020. "New Evidence on the Soft Budget Constraint: Chinese Environmental Policy Effectiveness in Private versus SOEs," Post-Print halshs-02469382, HAL.
  3. Corgnet, Brice & Martin, Ludivine & Ndodjang, Peguy & Sutan, Angela, 2019. "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 23-45.
  4. Heese, Jonas & Krishnan, Ranjani & Ramasubramanian, Hari, 2021. "The Department of Justice as a gatekeeper in whistleblower-initiated corporate fraud enforcement: Drivers and consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1).
  5. Anselm Hager & Lukas Hensel & Johannes Hermle & Christopher Roth, 2023. "Political Activists as Free Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(653), pages 2068-2084.
  6. Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," Post-Print hal-00445603, HAL.
  7. Alexis Walckiers, 2008. "Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: an application to universities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(2), pages 165-198, April.
  8. Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(1), pages 44-69, March.
  9. M. Rodwan Abouharb & David Cingranelli & Mikhail Filippov, 2019. "Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(5), pages 1-22, May.
  10. Jiancai Pi, 2018. "Another Look at Job Design with Conflicting Tasks," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 427-434, December.
  11. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
  12. Saint-Lary, Olivier & Sicsic, Jonathan, 2015. "Impact of a pay for performance programme on French GPs’ consultation length," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 119(4), pages 417-426.
  13. Macera, Rosario, 2018. "Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 551-594.
  14. Szydlowski, Martin, 2019. "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  15. Evangelia Chalioti, 2015. "Team Production, Endogenous Learning about Abilities and Career Concerns," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2020, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  16. Nicola Limodio, 2016. "Media, Demonstrations, and Public Good Delivery: Evidence from World Bank Projects during Natural Disasters," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 62, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  17. He, Zhiguo & Xiong, Wei, 2013. "Delegated asset management, investment mandates, and capital immobility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 239-258.
  18. Bond, Philip & Gomes, Armando, 2009. "Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 175-211, January.
  19. Galasso, Alberto & Mitchell, Matthew & Virag, Gabor, 2018. "A theory of grand innovation prizes," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 343-362.
  20. Chen, Yvonne Jie & Li, Pei & Lu, Yi, 2018. "Career concerns and multitasking local bureaucrats: Evidence of a target-based performance evaluation system in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 84-101.
  21. David Gaddis Ross, 2014. "An Agency Theory of the Division of Managerial Labor," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(2), pages 494-508, April.
  22. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
  23. John R. Bowblis & Stephen Crystal & Orna Intrator & Judith A. Lucas, 2012. "Response To Regulatory Stringency: The Case Of Antipsychotic Medication Use In Nursing Homes," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(8), pages 977-993, August.
  24. Trude Gunnes, 2021. "Norms and financial incentives: A model of how to fund universities," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 12(1).
  25. Wallace E. Huffman & Just, Richard E., 2010. "Setting Incentives for Scientists Who Engage in Research and Other Activities: An Application of Principal-Agent Theory," Staff General Research Papers Archive 31647, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  26. Jirjahn, Uwe & Kraft, Kornelius, 2006. "Do Spillovers Stimulate Incremental or Drastic Product Innovations? Hypotheses and Evidence from German Establishment Data," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-023, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  27. Altan, Baṣak, 2019. "Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
  28. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
  29. Gall, Thomas & Hu, Xiaocheng & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2023. "Incentivizing Team Leaders: A Firm-Level Experiment on Subjective Performance Evaluation of Leadership Skills," IZA Discussion Papers 16123, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  30. Olmos, Marta Fernandez & Martinez, Jorge Rosell, 2011. "The Quality-Quantity Trade-off in the Principal-Agent Framework," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 11(1), pages 1-12, January.
  31. Leon Wansleben, 2021. "Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 909-932, July.
  32. Demougin, Dominique & Helm, Carsten, 2023. "Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 654-669.
  33. Nuno-Ledesma, Jose G., 2020. "Incentive Alignment and Reward Strength in Pay-for-Performance Contracts," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304302, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  34. Gajardo, Felipe & Grau, Nicolás, 2019. "Competition among schools and educational quality: Tension between various objectives of educational policy," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 123-133.
  35. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
  36. Xie, Tingting & Yuan, Ye, 2023. "Go with the wind: Spatial impacts of environmental regulations on economic activities in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
  37. Seongwuk Moon, 2018. "Skill development, bargaining power, and a theory of job design," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 270-296, June.
  38. Charlene M. Kalenkoski & Gigi Foster, 2015. "Measuring the relative productivity of multitasking to sole-tasking in household production: experimental evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(18), pages 1847-1862, April.
  39. Akifumi Ishihara, 2020. "On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 693-736, December.
  40. Christopher Carrigan, 2018. "Clarity or collaboration: Balancing competing aims in bureaucratic design," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 6-44, January.
  41. Francisco Candel‐Sánchez & Juan Perote‐Peña, 2020. "Optimal Incentives on Multiple Prosocial Activities when Reputation Matters," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(3), pages 1207-1230, July.
  42. Jenny Kragl & Alberto Palermo & Guoqian Xi & Joern Block, 2023. "Hiring family or non-family managers when non-economic (sustainability) goals matter? A multitask agency model," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 675-700, August.
  43. Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2010. "The Institutional Foundations of China?s Reforms and Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7654, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  44. Sémirat, S., 2016. "Vertical conflict of interest and horizontal inequities," Working Papers 2016-06, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  45. Zahra Murad & Charitini Stavropoulou & Graham Cookson, 2019. "Incentives and gender in a multi-task setting: An experimental study with real-effort tasks," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(3), pages 1-18, March.
  46. Dasgupta, Aditya & Kapur, Devesh, 2021. "The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India," SocArXiv 2qvwb, Center for Open Science.
  47. Franck, Raphaël & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.
  48. Stéphan Sémirat, 2019. "Strategic information transmission despite conflict," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 921-956, September.
  49. Verbeck, Matthias, 2015. "Contracting with Researchers," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112963, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  50. Asunur Cezar & Huseyin Cavusoglu & Srinivasan Raghunathan, 2014. "Outsourcing Information Security: Contracting Issues and Security Implications," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(3), pages 638-657, March.
  51. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  52. Siklos, Pierre L., 2000. "Monetary policy transparency, public commentary, and market perceptions about monetary policy in Canada," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2000,08, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  53. Yong Soo Keong & Partha Sen & Cao Jing, 2024. "An Inquiry into the North-South Management Gap in China," CESifo Working Paper Series 10952, CESifo.
  54. Baranchuk, Nina, 2008. "Organizing multiple related tasks into jobs: Diversification vs. competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 599-603, June.
  55. Seabright, Paul, 2000. "Skill versus judgement and the architecture of organisations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 856-868, May.
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