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Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Bernard, Benjamin & Frei, Christoph, 2016. "The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
  2. Staudigl, Mathias, 2016. "On Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: Characterization of Continuation payoff processes," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 526, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  3. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2072/260962, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  4. Yuheng Zheng & Zihan Ding, 2024. "Reinforcement Learning in High-frequency Market Making," Papers 2407.21025, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  5. Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023. "Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(5), pages 1727-1761, September.
  6. Taub, B., 2023. "Signal-jamming in the frequency domain," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 896-930.
  7. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals," Working Papers 2072/249233, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  8. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2008. "Multimarket contact in continuous-time games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 4-5, October.
  9. Mason, Robin & Välimäki, Juuso, 2008. "Dynamic Moral Hazard and Project Completion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Hendrik Hakenes & Friederike Schlegel, 2014. "I Spy with my Little Eye... a Banking Crisis - Early Warnings and Incentive Schemes in Banks," CESifo Working Paper Series 5140, CESifo.
  11. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016. "How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 332-359.
  12. Dirk Hackbarth & Bart Taub, 2022. "Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5364-5383, July.
  13. Gonzalo Cisternas & Aaron Kolb, 2020. "Signaling with Private Monitoring," Papers 2007.15514, arXiv.org.
  14. Tadashi Hashimoto, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Games With Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 1155-1159, May.
  15. Kyna Fong, "undated". "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  16. Robin Mason & Juuso Välimäki, 2013. "Dynamic Moral Hazard and Stopping," Discussion Papers 1314, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  17. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
  18. Osório António M., 2012. "A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, April.
  19. Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2022. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Limited Enforcement," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2093-2127, September.
  20. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
  21. António Osório, 2018. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 387-404, August.
  22. Waknis, Parag, 2017. "Competitive Supply of Money in a New Monetarist Model," MPRA Paper 75401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Xi Chen & Yu Chen & Xuhu Wan, 2018. "Delegated Project Search," Graz Economics Papers 2018-11, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  24. Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2013. "Commitment in utility regulation: A model of reputation and policy applications," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 210-231.
  25. Aoyagi, Masaki & Fréchette, Guillaume, 2009. "Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1135-1165, May.
  26. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  27. David K Levine, 2024. "Behavioral Mechanism Design in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000190, David K. Levine.
  28. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2013. "Dynamic Deception," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2811-2847, December.
  29. Glötzl, Erhard & Glötzl, Florentin & Richters, Oliver & Binter, Lucas, 2023. "General Constrained Dynamic Models in Economics - General Dynamic Theory of Economic Variables - Beyond Walras and Keynes," MPRA Paper 118314, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Zhang, Yuzhe, 2009. "Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 635-675, March.
  31. Ryota Iijima & Akitada Kasahara, 2016. "Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring," ISER Discussion Paper 0965, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  32. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2013. "Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000685, David K. Levine.
  33. Prat, Andrea & Dessein, Wouter, 2019. "Organizational Capital, Corporate Leadership, and Firm Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  34. Christian Bayer & Klaus Waelde, 2011. "Describing the Dynamics of Distributions in Search and Matching Models by Fokker-Planck Equations," Working Papers 1110, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 21 Jul 2011.
  35. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  36. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2012. "The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments," Working Papers 2072/203171, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  37. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. Jan Eeckhout & Xi Weng, 2022. "Assortative Learning," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(355), pages 647-688, July.
  39. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kern, Johannes, 2015. "Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 34-57.
  40. Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2010. "Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 337-340, September.
  41. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
  42. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2017. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2072/290761, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  43. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2011. "Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions," Working Papers 2072/179668, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  44. Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2024. "Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
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