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Corrigendum to "Games With Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time"

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  • Tadashi Hashimoto

Abstract

Sannikov (2007) investigated properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous-time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of Lemma 6, required for the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2), contains an error in computing a Hessian matrix. A correct proof of Lemma 6 is provided using an additional innocuous assumption and a generalized version of Lemma 5. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Tadashi Hashimoto, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Games With Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 1155-1159, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:3:p:1155-1159
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yuliy Sannikov, 2007. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1285-1329, September.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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