Dynamic Moral Hazard and Stopping
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More about this item
Keywords
Principal-agent model; continuous time; moral hazard; project completion.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2013-12-06 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-12-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HRM-2013-12-06 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2013-12-06 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2013-12-06 (Project, Program and Portfolio Management)
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