Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Citations

Cited by:

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5. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers 96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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6. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1992. "A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 989, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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11. Besner, Manfred, 2022. "The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
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22. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2012. "Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 264-286, December.
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25. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
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26. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April.
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28. Lawrence Ausubel & Raymond Deneckere, 1985. "One is Almost Enough for Monopoly," Discussion Papers 669, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
29. Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000920, UCLA Department of Economics.
30. Yuming Fu & Stephen Ching, 2001. "Examining Competition in Land Market: An Application of Event Study to Land Auctions in Hong Kong," Wisconsin-Madison CULER working papers 01-01, University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economic Research.
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