A Rermark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games
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Other versions of this item:
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1992. "A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275557, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1992. "A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 989, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
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- Abreu, D. & Dutta, P., 1991. "The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games: A New Condition," RCER Working Papers 299, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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Keywords
game theory ; economic models;Statistics
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