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Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes

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  • Timo Goeschl
  • Ole Jürgens

Abstract

Public participation in environmental monitoring to alert regulators to possible non-compliance events has been credited with improving environmental quality and regulatory efficiency. At the same time, the reporting capability of such citizen monitoring schemes is known to be limited due to technical and organizational deficiencies. Recent enthusiasm for outside interventions that address these deficiencies in order to lower environmental harm and raise overall welfare therefore seems justified. A game-theoretic analysis of a monitoring and enforcement regime with citizen monitoring shows, however, that the effects of such interventions are likely to be subtle. A higher reporting capability of citizens involves substitution effects that have ambiguous effects on the regulator’s monitoring and enforcement costs: Welfare can actually decline and environmental improvements will fall short of expectations. In an extreme scenario we show that improved citizen monitoring can even have adverse effects on environmental quality. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2012. "Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 264-286, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:42:y:2012:i:3:p:264-286
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-012-9191-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Peter Maniloff & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2020. "If you see (or smell) something, say something: Citizen complaints and regulation of oil and gas wells," Working Papers 2020-01, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental regulation; Citizen monitoring; Sampling technology; D82; K42; Q53;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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