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Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2012. "Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 264-286, December.
  2. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005.
  3. Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2007. "Games without Rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 315-347, December.
  4. Robert J. Aumann, 2007. "War and Peace," Chapters, in: Jean-Philippe Touffut (ed.), Augustin Cournot: Modelling Economics, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  5. Pedro Dal Bo, 2002. "Three Essays on Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000038, David K. Levine.
  6. Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002199, David K. Levine.
  8. Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 335-355.
  9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  10. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers 96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  11. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
  12. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1992. "A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 989, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
  14. Faruk Gul, 1997. "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 159-174, Summer.
  15. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April.
  16. Pedro Bó, 2007. "Social norms, cooperation and inequality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(1), pages 89-105, January.
  17. van Damme, E.E.C., 1995. "Game theory : The next stage," Discussion Paper 1995-73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  18. Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 2009. "Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 404-425, May.
  19. Bergin, James, 1989. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 51-65, February.
  20. Besner, Manfred, 2022. "The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
  21. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 2017. "Whither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in games," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 5.
  23. Lawrence Ausubel & Raymond Deneckere, 1985. "One is Almost Enough for Monopoly," Discussion Papers 669, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  24. O. Gossner, 2000. "Sharing a long secret in a few public words," THEMA Working Papers 2000-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  25. Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000920, UCLA Department of Economics.
  26. Yuming Fu & Stephen Ching, 2001. "Examining Competition in Land Market: An Application of Event Study to Land Auctions in Hong Kong," Wisconsin-Madison CULER working papers 01-01, University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economic Research.
  27. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  28. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  29. GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  30. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Globalization and Cooperative Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3522, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  31. Arthur Zillante, 2005. "Spaced Out Monopolies: Theory and Empirics of Alternating Product Releases," Industrial Organization 0505008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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