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An Empirical-Investigation Of The Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis

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Cited by:

  1. Kaniel, Ron & DeMarzo, Peter, 2016. "Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 11538, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  3. Viktoria Diser & Christian Hofmann, 2018. "Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(7), pages 941-970, September.
  4. Martin Holzhacker & Stephan Kramer & Michal Matějka & Nick Hoffmeister, 2019. "Relative Target Setting and Cooperation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 211-239, March.
  5. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  6. Marwa Sallemi & Salah Ben Hamad & Nejla Ould Daoud Ellili, 2023. "Executive compensation and bank’s stability: which role of the corruption control? An empirical evidence from OECD banks," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(2), pages 457-477, June.
  7. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, 1999. "Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 145-168, Fall.
  8. Rajiv D. Banker & Rong Huang & Ramachandran Natarajan, 2009. "Incentive Contracting and Value Relevance of Earnings and Cash Flows," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 647-678, June.
  9. Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2015. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 2155-2184, October.
  10. Annalisa Luporini, 2006. "Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 235-243, May.
  11. Dunhong Jin & Thomas Noe, 2022. "The Golden Mean: The Risk‐Mitigating Effect of Combining Tournament Rewards with High‐Powered Incentives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(5), pages 2907-2947, October.
  12. Sun, Yang & Zhao, Wei, 2024. "Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 285-311.
  13. David Collard & Michael Godwin & John Hudson, 2005. "The Provision of Company Benefits in the UK," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(7‐8), pages 1397-1421, September.
  14. Ya‐chin Wang & Leonard F.s. Wang, 2009. "Equivalence Of Competition Mode In A Vertically Differentiated Duopoly With Delegation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(4), pages 577-590, December.
  15. Baiman, Stanley & Rajan, Madhav V., 2002. "Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 213-238, April.
  16. Corrado Cuccurullo & Massimo Aria & Fabrizia Sarto, 2016. "Foundations and trends in performance management. A twenty-five years bibliometric analysis in business and public administration domains," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 108(2), pages 595-611, August.
  17. Yoon, Young-Ro, 2015. "Strategic behavior in acquiring and revealing costly private information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 133-148.
  18. Canice Prendergast, 2000. "The Tenuous Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives," NBER Working Papers 7815, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Baber, William R. & Kang, Sok-Hyon & Kumar, Krishna R., 1998. "Accounting earnings and executive compensation:: The role of earnings persistence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 169-193, May.
  20. Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
  21. Young-Ro Yoon, 2017. "Strategic Disclosure Of Meaningful Information To Rival," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 806-824, April.
  22. Johnson, Shane A. & Tian, Yisong S., 2000. "Indexed executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 35-64, July.
  23. Nicola Meccheri & Luciano Fanti, 2012. "Managerial Delegation Schemes in a Duopoly with Endogenous Production Costs: A Comparison of Sales and Relative Profit Delegation under Centralised Unionisation," Working Paper series 44_12, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
  24. Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. "Performance standards in incentive contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 245-278, December.
  25. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
  26. Wong, Jin Boon & Zhang, Qin, 2023. "Managerial performance and oil price shocks," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
  27. Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.
  28. James Angel & Douglas McCabe, 2008. "The Ethics of Managerial Compensation: The Case of Executive Stock Options," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 225-235, March.
  29. Gao, Zhan & Hwang, Yuhchang & Wu, Wan-Ting, 2017. "Contractual features of CEO performance-vested equity compensation," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 282-303.
  30. Carlos Jiménez-Angueira & Nathan Stuart, 2015. "Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 701-732, May.
  31. Marco F. Boretto & Fausto Cavalli & Ahmad Naimzada, 2021. "Oligopoly model with interdependent preferences: existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium," Working Papers 462, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2021.
  32. Christoph Feichter & Frank Moers & Oscar Timmermans, 2022. "Relative Performance Evaluation and Competitive Aggressiveness," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(5), pages 1859-1913, December.
  33. Gerald J. Lobo & Michael Neel & Adrienne Rhodes, 2018. "Accounting comparability and relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 1137-1176, September.
  34. Lewellen, Wilbur G. & Park, Taewoo & Ro, Byung T., 1996. "Self-serving behavior in managers' discretionary information disclosure decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 227-251, April.
  35. Liu, Lisa Shifei & Stark, Andrew W., 2009. "Relative performance evaluation in board cash compensation: UK empirical evidence," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 21-30.
  36. An, Suwei, 2023. "Essays on incentive contracts, M&As, and firm risk," Other publications TiSEM dd97d2f5-1c9d-47c5-ba62-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  37. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal & Asish Kumar Bhattacharyya, 2016. "The role of operating efficiency and asset productivity in relative performance evaluation and CEO compensation in Indian firms," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 43(3), pages 201-221, September.
  38. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
  39. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
  40. Ili, Dragan & Pisarov, Sonja & Schmidt, Peter S., 2015. "Preaching Water But Drinking Wine? Relative Performance Evaluation in International Banking," Working papers 2015/10, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  41. Ge Bai & Ranjani Krishnan, 2016. "Effects of Ambiguous Common Uncertainty on Employee Preference for Relative Performance Contracts," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 6, pages 65-93, December.
  42. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  43. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
  44. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do," NBER Working Papers 7604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  45. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February.
  46. Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2012. "Managerial compensation contracts in quantity-setting duopoly," Working Papers 2012/17, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  47. Marco Celentani & Rosa Loveira-Pazó, 2004. "What form of relative performance evaluation?," Economics Working Papers 744, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  48. Dragan Ilić & Sonja Pisarov & Peter S. Schmidt, 2015. "Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking," ECON - Working Papers 208, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Aug 2016.
  49. Phan, Dinh Hoang Bach & Tran, Vuong Thao & Nguyen, Dat Thanh & Le, Anh, 2020. "The importance of managerial ability on crude oil price uncertainty-firm performance relationship," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
  50. Dragan Ilić & Sonja Pisarov & Peter S. Schmidt, 2019. "Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 155(1), pages 1-25, December.
  51. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, 1994. "CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures," NBER Working Papers 4976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  52. Albuquerque, Ana, 2009. "Peer firms in relative performance evaluation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 69-89, October.
  53. James Bannister & Harry Newman & Joseph Weintrop, 2011. "Tests for relative performance evaluation based on assumptions derived from proxy statement disclosures," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 127-148, August.
  54. Dopuch, Nicholas & Gupta, Mahendra, 1997. "Estimation of benchmark performance standards: An application to public school expenditures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 141-161, July.
  55. Taye Mengistae & Lixin Colin Xu, 2004. "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 615-638, July.
  56. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
  57. Lin Li & Peter Lam & Wilson H.S. Tong & Justin Law, 2024. "CEO Turnovers Due to Poor Industry Performances: An Examination of the Boards' Retention Criteria," Post-Print hal-04425594, HAL.
  58. Ryan T. Ball & Jonathan Bonham & Thomas Hemmer, 2020. "Does it pay to ‘Be Like Mike’? Aspiratonal peer firms and relative performance evaluation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 1507-1541, December.
  59. Na, Ke, 2020. "CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 679-700.
  60. Timmermans, Oscar, 2024. "Cash versus share payouts in relative performance plans," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123696, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  61. Merchant, Kenneth A. & Van der Stede, Wim A. & Zheng, Liu, 2003. "Disciplinary constraints on the advancement of knowledge: the case of organizational incentive systems," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 251-286.
  62. Jiang, Wei & Liu, Yunguo & Lobo, Gerald J. & Xu, Yue, 2019. "Deferred cash compensation and risk-taking: Evidence from the Chinese banking industry," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 432-448.
  63. John S. Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2009. "Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 71-82.
  64. SHEN, Yu & SHE, Kaiwen, 2024. "Loan origination and risk underpricing: The role of lending incentives," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PB).
  65. Hamamura, Jumpei & Hayakawa, Sho, 2019. "The optimal choice of a relative performance indicator in product market competition," MPRA Paper 93921, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  66. Bange, Mary M. & De Bondt, Werner F. M., 1998. "R&D budgets and corporate earnings targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 153-184, June.
  67. Valentin Haddad, 2012. "Concentrated Ownership and Equilibrium Asset Prices," 2012 Meeting Papers 902, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  68. Christopher Edmonds & Ryan Leece & John Maher, 2013. "CEO bonus compensation: the effects of missing analysts’ revenue forecasts," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 149-170, July.
  69. Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Manasakis, Constantine & Mitrokostas, Evangelos & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2016. "Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 205-217.
  70. Kim, Kyonghee, 2010. "Blockholder monitoring and the efficiency of pay-performance benchmarking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 748-766, December.
  71. DeFond, Mark L. & Park, Chul W., 1999. "The effect of competition on CEO turnover1," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 35-56, February.
  72. Stanimir Morfov & Manuel Santos, 2017. "A Model of Managerial Talent: Addressing Some Puzzles in CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2017-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  73. Marco F. Boretto & Fausto Cavalli & Ahmad Naimzada, 2021. "Characterization of Nash equilibria in Cournotian oligopolies with interdependent preferences," Working Papers 463, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2021.
  74. Agranov, Marina & Tergiman, Chloe, 2013. "Incentives and compensation schemes: An experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 238-247.
  75. Ramji Balakrishnan & Haijin Lin & Konduru Sivaramakrishnan, 2020. "Screening Talent for Task Assignment: Absolute or Percentile Thresholds?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 831-868, September.
  76. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca & Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., 2020. "Strategic inattention, delegation and endogenous market structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
  77. Jeremy Bertomeu & Edwige Cheynel & Michelle Liu‐Watts, 2018. "Are the Fama French factors treated as risk? Evidence from CEO compensation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 24(5), pages 728-774, November.
  78. Sangeun Ha & Fangyuan Ma & Alminas Žaldokas, 2021. "Motivating Collusion," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202108, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
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