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CEO bonus compensation: the effects of missing analysts’ revenue forecasts

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  • Christopher Edmonds
  • Ryan Leece
  • John Maher

Abstract

We investigate the incremental contract relevance of analysts’ revenue forecasts while controlling for earnings forecasts and find CEOs receive smaller bonuses when missing analysts’ annual and quarterly revenue expectations. Our results support the link between the value relevance of the revenue performance measure and the contract relevance of that measure. Further, we find revenue forecasts to be more contract relevant for CEOs of firms with high growth expectations, consistent with Rees and Sivaramakrishnan’s Contemp Acc Res 24(1):259–290, ( 2007 ) findings that growth firms receive a larger market penalty for missing revenue targets. Overall, our findings provide empirical support for the conjecture that compensation committees rely on information consistent with that conveyed in analysts’ revenue forecasts when contracting with management. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Edmonds & Ryan Leece & John Maher, 2013. "CEO bonus compensation: the effects of missing analysts’ revenue forecasts," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 149-170, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:149-170
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-012-0305-0
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    Cited by:

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    2. Shan Xue & Yuehua Xu & Honghui Chen, 2024. "Corporate social performance feedback and corporate social responsibility decoupling in China: The salience of legitimacy and/or efficiency," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(4), pages 3164-3180, July.
    3. Manikas, Andrew S. & Patel, Pankaj C., 2016. "Managing sales surprise: The role of operational slack and volume flexibility," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 101-116.
    4. Wei-Da Chen & Chin-Te Yu, 2022. "The information value of interim accounting disclosures: evidence from mandatory monthly revenue reports," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 245-295, January.
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    6. Michael Lacina & B. Brian Lee & Dong Wuk Kim, 2018. "Management of Revenue and Earnings in Korean Firms Influenced by Cognitive Reference Points," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(02), pages 1-36, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Analysts’ forecasts; Executive compensation; Missing benchmarks; G17; J33; M41; M53;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training

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