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Tests for relative performance evaluation based on assumptions derived from proxy statement disclosures

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  • James Bannister
  • Harry Newman
  • Joseph Weintrop

Abstract

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  • James Bannister & Harry Newman & Joseph Weintrop, 2011. "Tests for relative performance evaluation based on assumptions derived from proxy statement disclosures," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 127-148, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:127-148
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-010-0198-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    2. Sung Wook Joh, 1999. "Strategic Managerial Incentive Compensation In Japan: Relative Performance Evaluation And Product Market Collusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 303-313, May.
    3. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. John W. Byrd & Mailyn F. Johnson & Susan L. Porter, 1998. "Discretion in Financial Reporting: The Voluntary Disclosure of Compensation Peer Groups in Proxy Statement Performance Graphs," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 25-52, March.
    5. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30, April.
    6. Gaver, Jennifer J. & Gaver, Kenneth M., 1993. "Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 125-160, April.
    7. Wen-Hsiang Lin & Po-Sheng Ko & Hsueh Fang Chien & Wen-Chih Lee, 2010. "An Empirical Study on Issues in taiwanese Employee Reward Plans," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(01), pages 45-69.
    8. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    10. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:4:p:1619-1650 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. David Blackwell & Donna Dudney & Kathleen Farrell, 2007. "Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 315-338, October.
    12. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    13. Shivaram Rajgopal & Terry Shevlin & Valentina Zamora, 2006. "CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1813-1844, August.
    14. Sanjeev Bhojraj & Charles M. C. Lee & Derek K. Oler, 2003. "What's My Line? A Comparison of Industry Classification Schemes for Capital Market Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5), pages 745-774, December.
    15. Janakiraman, Sn & Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df, 1992. "An Empirical-Investigation Of The Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 53-69.
    16. Swee-Sum Lam & Bey-Fen Chng, 2006. "Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 249-274, May.
    17. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    18. Gerald Garvey & Todd Milbourn, 2003. "Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1557-1582, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Jiménez-Angueira & Nathan Stuart, 2015. "Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 701-732, May.
    2. Viktoria Diser & Christian Hofmann, 2018. "Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(7), pages 941-970, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Relative performance evaluation; Agency theory; Compensation committee report; J33; M41; M52;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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