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Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective

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Cited by:

  1. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
  2. Fabrizio Rossi & Richard J. Cebula, 2015. "Stock market reactions to announcements of the board of directors: evidence from Italy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(20), pages 2102-2118, April.
  3. Jiraporn, Pornsit & Davidson III, Wallace N. & DaDalt, Peter & Ning, Yixi, 2009. "Too busy to show up? An analysis of directors' absences," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 1159-1171, August.
  4. Eugene Kang & Mark Kroll, 2014. "Deciding Who Will Rule: Examining the Influence of Outside Noncore Directors on Executive Entrenchment," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 1662-1683, December.
  5. Abdelrhman Yusuf & Mohamed Sherif, 2020. "All on Board? New Evidence on Board Characteristics from a Large Panel of UK FTSE Indices," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(13), pages 1-26, July.
  6. Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada, 2012. "Interbank networks in prewar Japan: structure and implications," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 21(2), pages 463-506, April.
  7. Bremert, Michael & Schulten, Axel, 2008. "The impact of supervisory board characteristics on form performance," Papers 08-33, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  8. Rossi, Fabrizio & Cebula, Richard, 2013. "Stock Market Reactions to Announcements of Board of Director Appointments: Evidence from Italy," MPRA Paper 58403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Chen, Zonghao & Keefe, Michael O'Connor, 2020. "Rookie directors and firm performance: Evidence from China11We thank William L Megginson (the editor), two anonymous referees, Graeme Guthrie, Heng Geng, Adrian Cheung and seminar participants at the ," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  10. Hsin-Yi Yu & Brian G. M. Main, 2012. "Political Intervention, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation in Japan and Taiwan," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 1(1), pages 134-134, May.
  11. Ettore Croci & Rosanna Grassi, 2014. "The economic effect of interlocking directorates in Italy: new evidence using centrality measures," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 89-112, March.
  12. Panagiotis Karavitis & Pantelis Kazakis & Tianyue Xu, 2022. "CFO Working Experience and Tax Avoidance," Working Papers 2022_14, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  13. Caiazza, Rosa & Phan, Phillip H. & Simoni, Michele, 2023. "Theoretical and empirical differences between the interlocked boards of family and non-family firms," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2).
  14. Nguyen, Bang Dang & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, 2010. "The value of independent directors: Evidence from sudden deaths," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 550-567, December.
  15. Amy J. Hillman & Gavin Nicholson & Christine Shropshire, 2008. "Directors' Multiple Identities, Identification, and Board Monitoring and Resource Provision," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 441-456, June.
  16. Daniliuc, Sorin Ovidiu & Li, Lingwei & Wee, Marvin, 2020. "Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from Australian mergers," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  17. Mishra, Geeti & Patro, Archana & Tiwari, Aviral Kumar, 2024. "Does climate governance moderate the relationship between ESG reporting and firm value? Empirical evidence from India," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 920-941.
  18. Alqahtani, Jubran & Duong, Lien & Taylor, Grantley & Eulaiwi, Baban, 2022. "Outside directors, firm life cycle, corporate financial decisions and firm performance," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
  19. Ferris, Stephen P. & Liao, Min-Yu (Stella) & Tamm, Chris, 2018. "The compensation of busy directors: An international analysis," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 294-312.
  20. Chen, Li-Wen & Yu, Hsin-Yi, 2017. "Corporate governance, political involvement, and internationalization: An empirical investigation in Japan and Taiwan," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 640-655.
  21. Ahn, Seoungpil & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Kim, Young Sang, 2010. "Multiple directorships and acquirer returns," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 2011-2026, September.
  22. Kin-Wai Lee & Gillian Hian-Heng Yeo, 2016. "The association between integrated reporting and firm valuation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 1221-1250, November.
  23. Drago, Carlo & Millo, Francesco & Ricciuti, Roberto & Santella, Paolo, 2015. "Corporate governance reforms, interlocking directorship and company performance in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 38-49.
  24. Ting-Kai Chou & Hsuan-Ling Feng, 2019. "Multiple directorships and the value of cash holdings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 663-699, October.
  25. Muhammad Asad & Saeed Akbar & Sabur Mollah, 2024. "The role of independent directors’ tenure and network in controlling real-earnings management practices," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 1251-1279, November.
  26. Oliver Bischoff & Achim Buchwald, 2018. "Horizontal and Vertical Firm Networks, Corporate Performance and Product Market Competition," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 25-45, March.
  27. Carlos Drago & Francesco Millo & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Santella, 2011. "Corporate Governance Reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company Value in Italy (1998-2007)," CESifo Working Paper Series 3322, CESifo.
  28. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Low, Angie & Stulz, René M., 2010. "Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 12-32, July.
  29. Burak Güner, A. & Malmendier, Ulrike & Tate, Geoffrey, 2008. "Financial expertise of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 323-354, May.
  30. Canan C. Mutlu & Sunay Mutlu & Steve Sauerwald, 2021. "CEO outside directorships and managerial efficiency: The role of host board capital," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 45-66, January.
  31. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Buchwald, Achim & Peters, Heiko, 2011. "Outside board memberships of CEOs: Expertise or entrenchment?," DICE Discussion Papers 26, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  32. Eitan Moshe Goldman & Peggy Peiju Huang, 2015. "Contractual vs. Actual Separation Pay Following CEO Turnover," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(5), pages 1108-1120, May.
  33. Bradley Benson & Travis Davidson & Hui James & Hongxia Wang, 2022. "Board busyness and corporate payout: are all busy directors the same?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(3), pages 3711-3759, September.
  34. Buchwald, Achim, 2015. "Competition, outside directors and executive turnover: Implications for corporate governance in the EU," DICE Discussion Papers 174, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  35. ØYvind Bøhren & R. Øystein Strøm, 2010. "Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence and Diversity in the Board Room," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9‐10), pages 1281-1308, November.
  36. Adams, Mike & Jiang, Wei, 2016. "Do outside directors influence the financial performance of risk-trading firms? Evidence from the United Kingdom (UK) insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 36-51.
  37. Franco Ernesto Rubino & Paolo Tenuta & Domenico Rocco Cambrea, 2017. "Board characteristics effects on performance in family and non-family business: a multi-theoretical approach," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 623-658, September.
  38. Carlo Drago & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Santella, 2015. "An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform," Working Papers 2015.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  39. Kim, Keunyoung, 2022. "When are busy boards beneficial?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 437-454.
  40. Lawrence, Edward R. & Raithatha, Mehul, 2023. "Gender bias, board diversity, and firm value: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
  41. Bill B. Francis & Iftekhar Hasan & Qiang Wu, 2012. "Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 39-52, April.
  42. James Borthwick & Aelee Jun & Shiguang Ma, 2020. "Changing board behaviour: The role of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in improving the efficacy of Australian Say‐on‐Pay," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 827-876, April.
  43. Isabel-María García-Sánchez, 2010. "The effectiveness of corporate governance: board structure and business technical efficiency in Spain," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 18(3), pages 311-339, September.
  44. Falato, Antonio & Kadyrzhanova, Dalida & Lel, Ugur, 2014. "Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(3), pages 404-426.
  45. Julia Brennecke & Olaf N. Rank, 2017. "Tie heterogeneity in networks of interlocking directorates: a cost–benefit approach to firms’ tie choice," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 10(1), pages 97-122, June.
  46. Volonté, Christophe, 2015. "Boards: Independent and committed directors?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 25-37.
  47. Ahn, Seoungpil & Walker, Mark D., 2007. "Corporate governance and the spinoff decision," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 76-93, March.
  48. Mauro Romano & Christian Favino & Luca Pennacchio & Francesco Grimaldi, 2020. "CEO social capital in family businesses and its effect on investment opportunities: Asset or liability?," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(5), pages 2004-2015, September.
  49. Pombo, Carlos & Gutiérrez, Luis H., 2011. "Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 251-277, July.
  50. Ferris, Stephen P. & Jayaraman, Narayanan & Liao, Min-Yu (Stella), 2020. "Better directors or distracted directors? An international analysis of busy boards," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
  51. Teng, Ying & Ma, Zhenzhong & Liang, Dapeng & Song, Shenyi & Zheng, Yuhang, 2024. "The moderating effect of national culture on board interlocks’ impact on firm performance: A meta-analysis," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
  52. Pamela Brandes & Ravi Dharwadkar & Jonathan F. Ross & Linna Shi, 2022. "Time is of the Essence!: Retired Independent Directors’ Contributions to Board Effectiveness," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 767-793, September.
  53. Sheeba Kapil & Rakesh K Mishra, 2019. "Corporate Governance structure and firm performance in Indian context: A Structural Equation Modelling Approach," Working Papers 1937, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade.
  54. Fedaseyeu, Viktar & Linck, James S. & Wagner, Hannes F., 2018. "Do qualifications matter? New evidence on board functions and director compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 816-839.
  55. Limbach, Peter & Sonnenburg, Florian, 2014. "CEO fitness and firm value," CFR Working Papers 14-12 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
  56. Hauser, Roie, 2018. "Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 16-37.
  57. Edacherian, Saneesh & Panicker, Vidya Sukumara, 2022. "Do interlocks by different types of directors affect the nature of internationalization strategy of emerging market multinationals?," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4).
  58. Valeriano Sanchez-Famoso & Jorge-Humberto Mejia-Morelos & Luis Cisneros, 2020. "New Insights into Non-Listed Family SMEs in Spain: Board Social Capital, Board Effectiveness, and Sustainable Performance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-18, January.
  59. Field, Laura & Lowry, Michelle & Mkrtchyan, Anahit, 2013. "Are busy boards detrimental?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 63-82.
  60. Marwa Elnahass & Kamil Omoteso & Aly Salama & Vu Quang Trinh, 2020. "Differential market valuations of board busyness across alternative banking models," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 201-238, July.
  61. Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, 2007. "The Changing Structure of US Corporate Boards: 1997–2003," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1215-1223, November.
  62. Amin, Md Ruhul & Mazumder, Sharif & Aktas, Elvan, 2023. "Busy board and corporate debt maturity structure," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
  63. Jiraporn, Pornsit & Kim, Young Sang & Davidson III, Wallace N., 2008. "Multiple directorships and corporate diversification," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 418-435, June.
  64. Henrique Castro Martins & Cristiano Machado Costa, 2020. "Does control concentration affect board busyness? International evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 821-850, September.
  65. Benson, Bradley W. & Davidson, Wallace N. & Davidson, Travis R. & Wang, Hongxia, 2015. "Do busy directors and CEOs shirk their responsibilities? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-19.
  66. Francesca Arnaboldi & Barbara Casu, 2012. "Corporate Governance in European Banking," Chapters, in: James R. Barth & Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (ed.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 31, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  67. Mai Dao & Hua-Wei Huang & Jishan Zhu, 2012. "The Effects of Audit Committee Members' Age and Additional Directorships on the Cost of Equity Capital in the USA," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 607-643, September.
  68. Basuil, Dynah A. & Datta, Deepak K., 2017. "Value creation in cross-border acquisitions: The role of outside directors' human and social capital," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 35-44.
  69. Eulaiwi, Baban & Al-Hadi, Ahmed & Taylor, Grantley & Al-Yahyaee, Khamis Hamed & Evans, John, 2016. "Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 61-88.
  70. Stockmans, Annelies & Lybaert, Nadine & Voordeckers, Wim, 2013. "The conditional nature of board characteristics in constraining earnings management in private family firms," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 84-92.
  71. Karen M. Y. Lai & Andriyawan Sasmita & Ferdinand A. Gul & Yee Boon Foo & Marion Hutchinson, 2018. "Busy Auditors, Ethical Behavior, and Discretionary Accruals Quality in Malaysia," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 150(4), pages 1187-1198, July.
  72. Limbach, Peter & Sonnenburg, Florian, 2014. "CEO fitness and firm value," CFR Working Papers 14-12, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
  73. Chao Jiang & Thomas R. Kubick & Mihail K. Miletkov & M. Babajide Wintoki, 2018. "Offshore Expertise for Onshore Companies: Director Connections to Island Tax Havens and Corporate Tax Policy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(7), pages 3241-3268, July.
  74. George Drymiotes & Haijin Lin & Yonca Ertimur, 2020. "Shareholder Empowerment and Board of Directors Effectiveness," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 2649-2695, December.
  75. Hansin Bilgili & Jonathan L. Johnson & Tsvetomira V. Bilgili & Alan E. Ellstrand, 2022. "Research on social relationships and processes governing the behaviors of members of the corporate elite: a review and bibliometric analysis," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(8), pages 2285-2339, November.
  76. Upadhyay, Arun & Öztekin, Özde, 2021. "What matters more in board independence? Form or substance: Evidence from influential CEO-directors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  77. Reguera-Alvarado, Nuria & Bravo, Francisco, 2017. "The effect of independent directors’ characteristics on firm performance: Tenure and multiple directorships," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 590-599.
  78. Szymon Kaczmarek & Satomi Kimino & Annie Pye, 2014. "Interlocking directorships and firm performance in highly regulated sectors: the moderating impact of board diversity," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(2), pages 347-372, May.
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