Rookie directors and firm performance: Evidence from China11We thank William L Megginson (the editor), two anonymous referees, Graeme Guthrie, Heng Geng, Adrian Cheung and seminar participants at the Victoria University of Wellington, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies and the 2018 Financial Market and Corporate Governance Conference. All remaining errors are our own
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101511
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More about this item
Keywords
Rookie directors; Firm performance; China; Meeting attendance; Tunneling;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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