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Approval Voting

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kölle, Felix, 2020. "Governance and Group Conflict," MPRA Paper 98859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2020. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 415-428, September.
  3. Alexander Tabarrok & Lee Spector, 1999. "Would the Borda Count Have Avoided the Civil War?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 261-288, April.
  4. Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ), Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 4, pages 77-88, December.
  5. Rivas, Javier & Rockey, James, 2021. "Expressive voting with booing and cheering: Evidence from Britain," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  6. González-Díaz, Julio & Herold, Florian & Domínguez, Diego, 2016. "Strategic sequential voting," BERG Working Paper Series 113, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
  7. Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2011. "Making statements and approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 461-472, October.
  8. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
  9. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
  10. Gergaud, Olivier & Ginsburgh, Victor & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2021. "Wine Ratings: Seeking a Consensus among Tasters via Normalization, Approval, and Aggregation," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 321-342, August.
  11. Yilmaz, Mustafa R., 1999. "Can we improve upon approval voting?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 89-100, March.
  12. Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "On the origins of electoral systems and political parties. The role of elections in multi-member districts," Economics Working Papers 814, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  13. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2012. "The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing," IDEI Working Papers 722, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  14. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37, Springer.
  15. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
  16. Truchon, Michel, 1999. "La démocratie : oui, mais laquelle?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 189-214, mars-juin.
  17. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
  18. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
  19. Eivind Stensholt, 2010. "Voces populi and the art of listening," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 291-317, July.
  20. Núñez, Matías & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Implementation via approval mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 169-181.
  21. Ginsburgh, Victor & Zang, Israël, 2012. "Shapley Ranking of Wines," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 169-180, November.
  22. Le Breton, Michel & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2014. "Influence Vs. Utility in the Evaluation of Voting Rules: A New Look at the Penrose Formula," TSE Working Papers 14-511, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  23. Alcantud, José Carlos R. & de Andres Calle, Rocio & Cascon, José Manuel, 2012. "Approval consensus measures," MPRA Paper 39610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Post-Print halshs-00337290, HAL.
  25. Yakov Ben-Haim, 2021. "Approval and plurality voting with uncertainty: Info-gap analysis of robustness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 239-256, October.
  26. Jonathan Baron & Nicole Y. Altman & Stephan Kroll, 2005. "Approval Voting and Parochialism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(6), pages 895-907, December.
  27. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
  28. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
  29. repec:ksb:journl:v:4:y:2011:i:1:p:77-88 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Su, Francis Edward & Zerbib, Shira, 2019. "Piercing numbers in approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 65-71.
  31. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
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