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Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. He, Yinghua & Magnac, Thierry, 2018. "A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 11967, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  2. Horton, John J. & Johari, Ramesh & Kircher, Philipp, 2021. "Cheap Talk Messages for Market Design: Theory and Evidence from a Labor Market with Directed," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Kushnir, Alexey, 2013. "Harmful signaling in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 209-218.
  4. Eric Budish & Estelle Cantillon, 2012. "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2237-2271, August.
  5. Soohyung Lee & Muriel Niederle, 2015. "Propose with a rose? Signaling in internet dating markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 731-755, December.
  6. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  7. Alvin E. Roth, 2010. "Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions," NBER Working Papers 16556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Yash Kanoria & Daniela Saban, 2021. "Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(10), pages 5990-6029, October.
  9. Coles, Peter & Shorrer, Ran, 2014. "Optimal truncation in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 591-615.
  10. Laschever, Ron A. & Weinstein, Russell, 2021. "Preference Signaling and Worker-Firm Matching: Evidence from Interview Auctions," IZA Discussion Papers 14622, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  11. Carvalho, José-Raimundo & Magnac, Thierry & Xiong, Qizhou, 2016. "College Choice and the Selection of Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
  12. YingHua He & Thierry Magnac, 2022. "Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(648), pages 2918-2950.
  13. Salgado Alfredo, 2018. "Incomplete Information and Costly Signaling in College Admissions," Working Papers 2018-23, Banco de México.
  14. Nick Arnosti & Ramesh Johari & Yash Kanoria, 2021. "Managing Congestion in Matching Markets," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 620-636, May.
  15. Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
  16. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-153/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  17. Yeon-Koo Che & Youngwoo Koh, 2016. "Decentralized College Admissions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1295-1338.
  18. Somouaoga Bonkoungou, 2021. "Decentralized college admissions under single application," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 65-91, June.
  19. Maxwell Allman & Itai Ashlagi, 2023. "Interviewing Matching in Random Markets," Papers 2305.11350, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
  20. Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions," Papers 2001.06166, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
  21. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015. "Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
  22. T. Tony Ke & Yuting Zhu, 2021. "Cheap Talk on Freelance Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5901-5920, September.
  23. BONKOUNGOU, Somouaoga, 2016. "Pareto dominance of deferred acceptance through early decision," Cahiers de recherche 2016-07, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  24. Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen & Emil Chrisander, 2022. "Voluntary Information Disclosure in Centralized Matching: Efficiency Gains and Strategic Properties," Papers 2206.15096, arXiv.org.
  25. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, 2016. "A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1235-1268.
  26. Gleb Romanyuk & Alex Smolin, 2019. "Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 250-276, May.
  27. Janine Balter & Michela Rancan & Olena Senyuta, 2014. "Truncation in the Matching Markets and Market Ineffciency," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/04, European University Institute.
  28. Somouaoga BONKOUNGOU, 2016. "Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision," Cahiers de recherche 11-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  29. Alvin E. Roth, 2012. "Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 479-494.
  30. Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Yash Kanoria & Peng Shi, 2020. "Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2163-2193, May.
  31. Peng Shi, 2023. "Optimal Matchmaking Strategy in Two-Sided Marketplaces," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 1323-1340, March.
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