IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/aea/aecrev/v81y1991i1p297-301.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

A New Estimate of the Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Schreyögg, Jonas, 2002. "Medical Savings Accounts als Instrument zur Reduktion von moral hazard Verlusten bei der Absicherung des Krankheitsrisikos," Discussion Papers 2002/5, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
  2. John Nyman, 2008. "Health insurance theory: the case of the missing welfare gain," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 9(4), pages 369-380, November.
  3. Cardon, James H. & Showalter, Mark H., 2007. "Insurance choice and tax-preferred health savings accounts," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 373-399, March.
  4. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2022. "Coinsurance vs. co-payments: Reimbursement rules for a monopolistic medical product with competitive health insurers," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  5. Brigitte Dormont & Mathilde Péron, 2016. "Does Health Insurance Encourage the Rise in Medical Prices? A Test on Balance Billing in France," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(9), pages 1073-1089, September.
  6. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 2000. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 992-1005, October.
  7. Pierre Picard, 2016. "A Note on Health Insurance under Ex Post Moral Hazard," Risks, MDPI, vol. 4(4), pages 1-9, October.
  8. Bardey, David & Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2016. "The design of insurance coverage for medical products under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 28-37.
  9. Kelly, Mark, 2020. "Medicare for all or medicare for none? A macroeconomic analysis of healthcare reform," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  10. Katherine Baicker & Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein, 2015. "Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(4), pages 1623-1667.
  11. Jonathan Gruber, 2008. "Covering the Uninsured in the U.S," NBER Working Papers 13758, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Henke, Klaus-Dirk & Borchardt, Katja & Schreyögg, Jonas & Farhauer, Oliver, 2003. "Eine ökonomische Analyse unterschiedlicher Finanzierungsmodelle der Krankenversorgung in Deutschland," Discussion Papers 2003/4, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
  13. Pierre-Yves Geoffard, 2012. "Incentive and Selection Effects in Health Insurance," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  14. Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
  15. Run Liang & Hao Wang, 2017. "Health insurance, market power, and social welfare," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 427-442, December.
  16. Christopher T Robertson & Andy Yuan & Wendan Zhang & Keith Joiner, 2020. "Distinguishing moral hazard from access for high-cost healthcare under insurance," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-17, April.
  17. Kelly, Mark, 2017. "Health capital accumulation, health insurance, and aggregate outcomes: A neoclassical approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1-22.
  18. Nell, Martin & Richter, Andreas & Schiller, Jörg, 2009. "When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 343-354, April.
  19. Besanko, David & Dranove, David & Garthwaite, Craig, 2020. "Insurance access and demand response: Pricing and welfare implications," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  20. Bradley Herring & Mark Pauly, 2003. "Incentive-Compatible Guaranteed Renewable Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9888, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Jacob, Johanna & Lundin, Douglas, 2005. "A median voter model of health insurance with ex post moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 407-426, March.
  22. Kowalski, Amanda E., 2015. "Estimating the tradeoff between risk protection and moral hazard with a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 122-135.
  23. Dormont, B. & Péron, M., 2015. "Does health insurance encourage the rise in medical prices?," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 15/16, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
  24. Folmer, Cees & Westerhout, Ed, 2008. "Financing medical specialist services in The Netherlands: Welfare implications of imperfect agency," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 946-958, September.
  25. Qianhong Lu & Xiaoqing Gan & Zhensheng Chen, 2023. "The Impact of Medical Insurance Payment Policy Reform on Medical Cost and Medical Burden in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-18, January.
  26. Anlauf, Markus & Wigger, Berthold U., 1999. "Health insurance and consumer welfare : The case of monopolistic drug markets," Discussion Papers 565, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
  27. Cockx, Bart & Brasseur, Carine, 2003. "The demand for physician services: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 881-913, November.
  28. Ed Westerhout & K. Folmer, 2002. "Financing medical specialist services in the Netherlands; welfare implications of imperfect agency," CPB Discussion Paper 6, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  29. Blomqvist, Ake, 2001. "Does the economics of moral hazard need to be revisited? A comment on the paper by John Nyman," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 283-288, March.
  30. Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2017. "On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers hal-01348551, HAL.
  31. Chiu, W. Henry, 1997. "Health insurance and the welfare of health care consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 125-133, April.
  32. Fabrizio Balassone & Philip Jones, 1998. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: Properties of a Penalty Structure," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(3), pages 270-285, May.
  33. Çağatay Koç, 2005. "Health‐Specific Moral Hazard Effects," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 98-118, July.
  34. Ellis, Randall P. & Jiang, Shenyi & Manning, Willard G., 2015. "Optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 89-106.
  35. Wigger, Berthold U. & Anlauf, Markus, 2002. "Moral Hazard, Market Power, and Second Best Health Insurance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  36. Farhauer, Oliver & Borchardt, Katja & Stargardt, Tom, 2004. "Bürgerversicherung: Die Wirkung von Kopfprämien auf den Arbeitsmarkt," Discussion Papers 2004/8, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
  37. Blomqvist, Ake, 1997. "Optimal non-linear health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 303-321, June.
  38. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2010. "Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 129-144, March.
  39. Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2019. "Reducing Medical Spending of the Publicly Insured: The Case for a Cash-out Option," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 390-426, August.
  40. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2016. "Individual Welfare When Consumers Can Shop For Health Insurance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1283-1290, April.
  41. repec:dau:papers:123456789/15235 is not listed on IDEAS
  42. H. Frech & Christopher Whaley & Benjamin Handel & Liora Bowers & Carol Simon & Richard Scheffler, 2015. "Market Power, Transactions Costs, and the Entry of Accountable Care Organizations in Health Care," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(2), pages 167-193, September.
  43. Savage, Elizabeth & Wright, Donald J., 2003. "Moral hazard and adverse selection in Australian private hospitals: 1989-1990," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 331-359, May.
  44. Keeler, Emmett B., 1995. "A model of demand for effective care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 231-238, June.
  45. Perronnin, Marc, 2013. "Effet de l'assurance complémentaire santé sur les consommations médicales, entre risque moral et amélioration de l'accès aux soins," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/13659 edited by Wittwer, Jérôme.
  46. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The value of health insurance: the access motive," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-152, April.
  47. Sidorenko, Alexandra, 2001. "Stochastic Model of Demand for Medical Care with Endogenous Labour Supply and Health Insurance," Departmental Working Papers 2001-08, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
  48. Jacob, Johanna & Lundin, Douglas, 2001. "A Median Voter Model of Health Insurance with Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Paper Series 2001:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  49. Zabinski, Daniel & Selden, Thomas M. & Moeller, John F. & Banthin, Jessica S., 1999. "Medical savings accounts: microsimulation results from a model with adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 195-218, April.
  50. Selden, Thomas M., 1999. "Premium subsidies for health insurance: excessive coverage vs. adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 709-725, December.
  51. Ed Westerhout & Kees Folmer, 2007. "Co-payment systems in health care; between moral hazard and risk reduction," CPB Discussion Paper 78, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  52. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.