Does health insurance encourage the rise in medical prices?
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More about this item
Keywords
health insurance; balance billing; health care access;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2015-10-17 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2015-10-17 (Insurance Economics)
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