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Who Bosses Whom? The Intensity of Supervision and the Discipline of Labor

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Arjun Jayadev, "undated". "Estimating Guard Labor," Working Papers 7, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department.
  2. Dennis Dittrich & Martin Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  3. Sessions, John G., 2008. "Wages, supervision and sharing," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 653-672, November.
  4. Sang‐Moon Hahm & Katarina Mayer, 2011. "Equilibrium unemployment as a discipline device when finding employment is costly," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(2), pages 709-717, May.
  5. Jayadev, Arjun & Bowles, Samuel, 2006. "Guard labor," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 328-348, April.
  6. Ourania Karakosta & Nikos Tsakiris, 2009. "Indirect Tax Reforms and Public Goods under Imperfect Competition," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
  7. Anthony Eisenbarth & Zhuo Fu Chen, 2022. "The evolution of wage inequality within local U.S. labor markets," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 56(1), pages 1-25, December.
  8. John G. Sessions & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2014. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 105-162, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  9. Luke Petach & Anastasia Wilson, 2024. "The Rise of Guard Labor in the United States: Evidence from Local Labor Markets," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 56(2), pages 185-213, June.
  10. João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, 2020. "The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 115-132, June.
  11. Lambert, Thomas, 2016. "Monopoly Capital and Capitalist Management: Too Many Managers?," MPRA Paper 71988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. repec:eid:wpaper:27/09 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Francis Green & Steven McIntosh, 1998. "Union Power, Cost of Job Loss, and Workers' Effort," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 51(3), pages 363-383, April.
  14. Andreas P. Georgiadis, 2006. "Is there a Wage-Supervision Trade-Off? Efficiency Wages Evidence From the 1990 British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 06/152, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
  15. Samuel Bowles & Arjun Jayadev, 2004. "Guard Labor: An Essay in Honor of Pranab Bardhan," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2004-15, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  16. Robert Drago, 1995. "Divide and Conquer in Australia: A Study of Labor Segmentation," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 25-70, March.
  17. Rebitzer, James B., 1995. "Is there a trade-off between supervision and wages? An empirical test of efficiency wage theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 107-129, September.
  18. Andreas Georgiadis, 2013. "Efficiency Wages and the Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage: Evidence from a Low-Wage Labour Market," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 75(6), pages 962-979, December.
  19. Johann Jaekel, 2012. "Work Effort, Firm Closure and Signaling through Excess Capacity Investment," SCEPA working paper series. 2012-7, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
  20. Hugo van Driel & Ferry de Goey & Jacques van Gerwen, 2007. "Testing the Chandler Thesis: Comparing middle management and administrative intensity in Dutch and US industries, 1900-1950," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(4), pages 439-463.
  21. Mason, Patrick L., 1993. "Variable labor effort, involuntary unemployment, and effective demand," MPRA Paper 11331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. Georgiadis, Andreas, 2008. "Efficiency wages and the economic effects of the minimum wage: evidence from a low-wage labour market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19628, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  23. André Cieplinski, 2018. "Supervision and Work Content: Industry level evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 776, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  24. Joao Ricardo Faria, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the Peter and Dilbert Principles," Working Paper Series 101, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
  25. Lambert, Thomas, 2018. "Big Business and Management: Too Many Bosses and Too Much Pay?," MPRA Paper 86406, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Magnus Allgulin & Tore Ellingsen, 2002. "Monitoring and Pay," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 201-216, Part.
  27. Garcia-Prado, Ariadna, 2005. "Sweetening the carrot : motivating public physicians for better performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3772, The World Bank.
  28. Kocher, Martin & Dittrich, Dennis, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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