Testing the Chandler Thesis: Comparing middle management and administrative intensity in Dutch and US industries, 1900-1950
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1080/00076790701296043
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gordon, David M, 1990. "Who Bosses Whom? The Intensity of Supervision and the Discipline of Labor," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 28-32, May.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Magnus Allgulin & Tore Ellingsen, 2002.
"Monitoring and Pay,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 201-216, Part.
- Allgulin, Magnus & Ellingsen, Tore, 1998. "Monitoring and Pay," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 245, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 22 Nov 1999.
- Arjun Jayadev, "undated". "Estimating Guard Labor," Working Papers 7, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department.
- John G. Sessions & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2014.
"Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring,"
Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 105-162,
Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Sessions, John G. & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2008. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," IZA Discussion Papers 3307, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Louis N. Christofides & Michael Hoy & Ling Yang, 2008. "The Determinants of University Participation in Canada (1977-2003)," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 4-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- John Sessions & N Theodoropoulos, 2009. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," Department of Economics Working Papers 27/09, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
- Robert Drago, 1995. "Divide and Conquer in Australia: A Study of Labor Segmentation," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 25-70, March.
- Francis Green & Steven McIntosh, 1998. "Union Power, Cost of Job Loss, and Workers' Effort," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 51(3), pages 363-383, April.
- Eisenbarth, Anthony & Chen, Zhou Fu, 2022.
"The evolution of wage inequality within local U.S. labor markets,"
Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 56, pages 1-2.
- Anthony Eisenbarth & Zhuo Fu Chen, 2022. "The evolution of wage inequality within local U.S. labor markets," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 56(1), pages 1-25, December.
- Ourania Karakosta & Nikos Tsakiris, 2009. "Indirect Tax Reforms and Public Goods under Imperfect Competition," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Lambert, Thomas, 2016. "Monopoly Capital and Capitalist Management: Too Many Managers?," MPRA Paper 71988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dennis Dittrich & Martin Kocher, 2006.
"Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2006-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Dittrich, Dennis A. V. & Kocher, Martin G., 2011. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Discussion Papers in Economics 12222, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Dennis Dittrich & Martin G. Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-098/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Sessions, John G., 2008.
"Wages, supervision and sharing,"
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 653-672, November.
- Sarah Brown & Fathi Fakhfakh & John G. Sessions, "undated". "Wages, Supervision and Sharing," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 00/4, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Lambert, Thomas, 2018. "Big Business and Management: Too Many Bosses and Too Much Pay?," MPRA Paper 86406, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andreas Georgiadis, 2013. "Efficiency Wages and the Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage: Evidence from a Low-Wage Labour Market," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 75(6), pages 962-979, December.
- João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, 2020. "The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 115-132, June.
- Andreas P. Georgiadis, 2006. "Is there a Wage-Supervision Trade-Off? Efficiency Wages Evidence From the 1990 British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 06/152, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- André Cieplinski, 2018. "Supervision and Work Content: Industry level evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 776, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Jayadev, Arjun & Bowles, Samuel, 2006. "Guard labor," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 328-348, April.
- Johann Jaekel, 2012. "Work Effort, Firm Closure and Signaling through Excess Capacity Investment," SCEPA working paper series. 2012-7, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
- Sang‐Moon Hahm & Katarina Mayer, 2011. "Equilibrium unemployment as a discipline device when finding employment is costly," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(2), pages 709-717, May.
- Mason, Patrick L., 1993. "Variable labor effort, involuntary unemployment, and effective demand," MPRA Paper 11331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Luke Petach & Anastasia Wilson, 2024. "The Rise of Guard Labor in the United States: Evidence from Local Labor Markets," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 56(2), pages 185-213, June.
More about this item
Keywords
Managerial Revolution; Managerial Hierarchies; Middle Managers; Administrative Employees; Industry; Twentieth Century; The Netherlands; USA;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:bushst:v:49:y:2007:i:4:p:439-463. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/FBSH20 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.