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Monitoring and Pay

Author

Listed:
  • Allgulin, Magnus

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • Ellingsen, Tore

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result hinges critically on restrictive assumptions regarding workers' choice of effort - for example that there are only two possible effort levels. Under more reasonable assumptions, monitoring and pay are complementary instruments. Another result is that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the wage level and the workers' rents. Finally, much of the empirical literature on the monitoring-pay relationship is shown to be seriously misguided.

Suggested Citation

  • Allgulin, Magnus & Ellingsen, Tore, 1998. "Monitoring and Pay," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 245, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 22 Nov 1999.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0245
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon, David M, 1990. "Who Bosses Whom? The Intensity of Supervision and the Discipline of Labor," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 28-32, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monitoring; efficiency wages; incentive pay.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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