IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/aea/aecrev/v72y1982i5p1038-55.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
  3. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2005. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(4), pages 681-724, October.
  4. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1989. "Turnover, wages, and adverse selection," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 25(Q I), pages 18-28.
  5. Glenn MacDonald & Leslie M. Marx, 2001. "Adverse Specialization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 864-899, August.
  6. Ghatak, Maitreesh & ,, 2011. "Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 8298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Virginia Minni, 2023. "Making the invisible hand visible: Managers and the allocation of workers to jobs," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 72, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  8. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-380, October.
  9. Orn B. Bodvarsson, 1987. "Monitoring with No Moral Hazard: The Case of Small Vessel Commercial Fishing," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 421-434, Oct-Dec.
  10. G L Clark, 1986. "Towards an Alternative Conception of Job-Search Theory and Policy: Information as an Indeterminate Process," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 18(6), pages 803-825, June.
  11. Andrew T. Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 92(Win), pages 79-91.
  12. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2015. "Misallocation of Talent in Competitive Labor Markets," Working Papers 740, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  13. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-250, April.
  14. Arnaud Dupuy & Lex Borghans, 2005. "Supply and demand, allocation and wage inequality: an international comparison," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(9), pages 1073-1088.
  15. Johnathan Boone & Joel Watson, 2007. "Testing and the Composition of the Labor Pool," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(4), pages 883-903, December.
  16. Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-1047.
  17. Elena Pastorino, 2015. "Job Matching Within And Across Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(2), pages 647-671, May.
  18. Oyer, Paul, 2008. "Ability and employer learning: Evidence from the economist labor market," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 268-289, June.
  19. Heski Bar-Isaac & Raphaël Lévy, 2022. "Motivating Employees through Career Paths," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 95-131.
  20. Lawson, Nicholas, 2024. "You should reject this paper: Dynamic agency, sequential evaluation, and learning in academic publishing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 112-140.
  21. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  22. Th'eo Durandard, 2023. "Dynamic delegation in promotion contests," Papers 2308.05668, arXiv.org.
  23. d’Andria, Diego, 2018. "Superstars and mediocrities: A solution based on personal income taxation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 459-463.
  24. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Theodore Papageorgiou, 2009. "Learning Your Comparative Advantages," 2009 Meeting Papers 1150, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  26. Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 335-376, April.
  27. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432.
  28. Martinez Leonardo, 2009. "Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, May.
  29. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Canidio, Andrea, 2016. "The Value of Entrepreneurial Failures: Task Allocation and Career Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 11295, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  31. Canidio, Andrea, 2019. "Task Discretion, Labor Market Frictions and Entrepreneurship," CEPR Discussion Papers 13954, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Matthew C. Clayton & Jay C. Hartzell & Joshua Rosenberg, 2005. "The Impact of CEO Turnover on Equity Volatility," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1779-1808, September.
  33. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & George T. Milkovich, 1987. "Compensation and Firm Performance," NBER Working Papers 2145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  34. Arnaud Dupuy & Lex Borghans, 2005. "Supply and demand, allocation and wage inequality: an international comparison," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(9), pages 1073-1088.
  35. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  36. Hans K. Hvide, 2003. "Education and the Allocation of Talent," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(4), pages 945-976, October.
  37. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Reputation and Career Concerns," 2006 Meeting Papers 853, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  39. Akiko Maruyama, 2013. "Learning about one's own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-24, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  40. Brown, Jason L. & Farrington, Sukari & Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2016. "Biased self-assessments, feedback, and employees' compensation plan choices," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 45-59.
  41. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2015. "Misallocation of Talent in Competitive Labor Markets," Working Papers 740, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  42. Fabian Lange, 2005. "The Returns to Schooling and Ability During the Early Career: Evidence on Employer Learning and Post-School Investment," 2005 Meeting Papers 253, Society for Economic Dynamics.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.