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Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns

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  • Andrew T. Foerster
  • Leonardo Martinez

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  • Andrew T. Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 92(Win), pages 79-91.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2006:i:win:p:79-91:n:v.92no.1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rosen, S., 1990. "Contracts and Market for Executives," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-12, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    4. Svensson, Jakob & Shi, Min, 2002. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 3352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. John A. Weinberg, 2003. "Accounting for corporate behavior," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 89(Sum), pages 1-20.
    6. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    7. Kevin J. Stiroh, 2007. "Playing For Keeps: Pay And Performance In The Nba," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 145-161, January.
    8. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1999. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(4), pages 1321-1358.
    9. Illoong Kwon, 2006. "Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 100-120, March.
    10. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563, Elsevier.
    11. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    12. Amil Dasgupta & Andrea Prat, 2005. "Reputation and Asset Prices: A Theory of Information Cascades and Systematic Mispricing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000368, UCLA Department of Economics.
    13. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2005. "The politics of central bank independence: a theory of pandering and learning in government," Staff Reports 205, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    14. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
    15. Dan Bernhardt, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 315-339.
    16. MacDonald, Glenn M, 1982. "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1038-1055, December.
    17. Mr. Ehtisham Ahmad & Mr. Leonardo Martinez, 2004. "On the Design and Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs," IMF Working Papers 2004/220, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2003. "Firms, assignments, and earnings," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 89(Fall), pages 69-81.
    19. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-1134, December.
    20. Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-846, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Loss & Antoine Renucci, 2021. "Promotions, managerial project choice, and implementation effort," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 799-819, November.
    2. Leonardo Martinez, 2009. "Why could political incentives be different during election times?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 95(Sum), pages 315-334.

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    Productivity; Employment;

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