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Learning about one's own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty

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  • Akiko Maruyama

    (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

Abstract

This paper examines the movement of an individual’s reservation level over time in a two-sided search model with two-sided imperfect self-knowledge, where agents are vertically heterogeneous and do not know their own types. Agents who do not know their own types update their beliefs about their own types through the offers or rejections they receive from others. The results in this paper show that an agent with imperfect self-knowledge revises his or her reservation level downward when the agent receives a rejection that has some information about his or her own type. In contrast, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge revises his or her reservation level upward when the agent receives an offer from an agent of the opposite sex who is of lower type than the reservation level. This upward revision of an agent’s reservation level is due to the environment of two-sided imperfect self-knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Akiko Maruyama, 2013. "Learning about one's own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-24, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:ngi:dpaper:12-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Akiko Maruyama, 2018. "One-sided learning about one fs own type in a two-sided search model: The case of n types of agents," GRIPS Discussion Papers 18-15, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

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