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Managerial Power and Compensation

Author

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  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Marcel Kucher

Abstract

According to the widely used Managerial Power Model, a higher hierarchical position with associated higher power leads to higher compensation. In contrast, the Compensating Wage Differentials Model argues that there is a non-positive relationship between positional power and total compensation. Both power and income yield utility and in equilibrium managers are prepared to trade-off the two elements. The two opposing propositions are tested using a large survey data set from Switzerland. The results suggest that power positions do not yield higher compensation. Rather, there is a non-positive relationship between power position and compensation, if one takes into account all relevant factors influencing total compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey & Marcel Kucher, "undated". "Managerial Power and Compensation," IEW - Working Papers 028, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:028
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    File URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51842/1/iewwp028.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, 1989. "Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 121-134, March.
    2. Rosen, Sherwin, 1987. "The theory of equalizing differences," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 641-692, Elsevier.
    3. Charles Brown, 1980. "Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(1), pages 113-134.
    4. Sidney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, 1988. "Chief executive compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(6), pages 543-558, November.
    5. Donald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, 1995. "The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: The case of CEO pay raises," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 175-193.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dur, Robert & Glazer, Amihai, 2008. "The desire for impact," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 285-300, June.
    2. Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner & Schmalfu[ss], Bjorn, 2001. "Random fixed points in a stochastic Solow growth model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 19-30, September.
    3. Josse Delfgaauw, 2005. "Where to go? Workers' Reasons to quit and Intra- versus Interindustry Job Mobility," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-027/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 08 Aug 2005.
    4. Jens-Ulrich Peter & Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hopp�, "undated". "Business Cycle Phenomena in Overlapping Generations Economies with Stochastic Production," IEW - Working Papers 030, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Power; Managerial Compensation; Compensating Wage Differentials;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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