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Martin Pollrich

Personal Details

First Name:Martin
Middle Name:
Last Name:Pollrich
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppo542
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/view/martinpollrich/
Terminal Degree:2015 Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I; Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät; Humboldt-Universität Berlin (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(95%) Centre for Economics at Paris-Saclay (CEPS)
Graduate School of Economics and Management
Université Paris-Saclay

Saint-Aubin, France
https://www.ceps-paris-saclay.fr/
RePEc:edi:epevrfr (more details at EDIRC)

(5%) Département de sciences sociales
École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay (ENS)

Cachan, France
http://sociens.ens-paris-saclay.fr/
RePEc:edi:dsencfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2023. "The irrelevance of fee structures for certification," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0017, Berlin School of Economics.
  2. Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2023. "On the (Ir)Relevance of Fee Structures in Certification," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 391, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  3. Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_158, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  4. Colin von Negenborn & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_019v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  5. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  6. Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  7. Martin Pollrich & Robert Schmidt, 2015. "Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation," BDPEMS Working Papers 1, Berlin School of Economics.
  8. Pollrich, Martin & Schmidt, Robert C., 2014. "Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 480, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  9. Schmidt, Robert & Pollrich, Martin & Stiel, Caroline, 2013. "An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79741, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  10. Martin Pollrich, "undated". "The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version -," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015004, Berlin School of Economics.
  11. Martin Pollrich, "undated". "Mediated Audits," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015003, Berlin School of Economics.
  12. Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, "undated". "Informational opacity and honest certication," BDPEMS Working Papers 2013001, Berlin School of Economics.

Articles

  1. Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2024. "The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 55-72, March.
  2. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
  3. Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
  4. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  5. Martin Pollrich, 2017. "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 44-68, March.
  6. Pollrich, Martin & Wagner, Lilo, 2016. "Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 345-360.
  7. Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, 2013. "Gütesiegel: zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 80(19), pages 15-18.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_158, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2017. "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," MPRA Paper 79181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
    3. Jibang Wu & Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru & Haifeng Xu, 2021. "Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders," Papers 2109.04888, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.

  2. Colin von Negenborn & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_019v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    2. Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023. "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).

  3. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
    2. Kris De Jaegher & Michal Soltes & Vitezslav Titl, 2023. "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp757, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    3. Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022. "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers 2208.04985, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.

  4. Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthew J. Walker & Elena Katok & Jason Shachat, 2023. "Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3492-3515, June.

  5. Martin Pollrich & Robert Schmidt, 2015. "Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation," BDPEMS Working Papers 1, Berlin School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Nachtigall, 2019. "Dynamic Climate Policy Under Firm Relocation: The Implications of Phasing Out Free Allowances," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(1), pages 473-503, September.
    2. Nachtigall, Daniel, 2016. "Climate policy under firm relocation: The implications of phasing out free allowances," Discussion Papers 2016/25, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.

  6. Martin Pollrich, "undated". "The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version -," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015004, Berlin School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Pollrich, Martin, 2015. "Mediated Audits," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 809, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

  7. Martin Pollrich, "undated". "Mediated Audits," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015003, Berlin School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Contract Design With Limited Commitment," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168269, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Andrew Kosenko, 2020. "Mediated Persuasion," Papers 2012.00098, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    3. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-056, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Martin Pollrich, "undated". "The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version -," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015004, Berlin School of Economics.
    5. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

  8. Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, "undated". "Informational opacity and honest certication," BDPEMS Working Papers 2013001, Berlin School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, 2013. "Gütesiegel: zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 80(19), pages 15-18.
    2. Loerke, Petra & Niedermayer, Andreas, 2015. "Crises and Rating Agencies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 521, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Marta Allegra Ronchetti, 2015. "Credit Rating Agency, Preliminary Ratings and Contact Disclosure," Discussion Papers 2015/04, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
    4. Marta Allegra Ronchetti, 2018. "Preliminary credit ratings and contact disclosure," Discussion Papers 2018/02, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).

Articles

  1. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Martin Pollrich, 2017. "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 44-68, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Pollrich, Martin & Wagner, Lilo, 2016. "Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 345-360.

    Cited by:

    1. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/417, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Sungho Yun, 2021. "Regulating corruptible certifier behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 109-135, April.
    3. Loerke, Petra & Niedermayer, Andras, 2018. "On the effect of aggregate uncertainty on certification intermediaries’ incentives to distort ratings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 20-48.
    4. Marta Allegra Ronchetti, 2018. "Preliminary credit ratings and contact disclosure," Discussion Papers 2018/02, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 15 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (12) 2014-10-13 2014-10-22 2015-03-13 2015-06-27 2016-02-29 2018-06-11 2019-09-09 2019-10-14 2020-03-09 2021-03-22 2021-06-14 2023-06-26. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (6) 2013-04-27 2014-10-13 2014-10-22 2015-02-16 2015-05-09 2019-09-09. Author is listed
  3. NEP-DES: Economic Design (4) 2018-06-11 2019-09-09 2020-03-09 2021-03-22
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2015-05-09 2018-06-11 2020-03-09 2021-03-22
  5. NEP-REG: Regulation (3) 2014-10-13 2016-02-29 2019-10-14
  6. NEP-ACC: Accounting and Auditing (2) 2015-05-09 2015-06-27
  7. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2014-10-13 2016-02-29
  8. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2019-10-14
  9. NEP-ENE: Energy Economics (1) 2015-02-16
  10. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (1) 2014-10-13
  11. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2014-10-13
  12. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2014-10-22
  13. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2015-05-09

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