Strategic Sequential Bidding for Government Land Auction Sales – Evidence from Singapore
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DOI: 10.1007/s11146-017-9625-0
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- Diao, Mi & Fan, Yi & Sing, Tien Foo, 2021. "Rational pricing responses of developers to supply shocks: Evidence from Singapore," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 802-815.
- Shao-Chi Fang & Wen-Chih Yeh & Chun-Chang Lee & Zheng Yu, 2021. "Factors Affecting the Price of Cost-Equivalent Land: Application of Hierarchical Linear Modeling," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-23, June.
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Keywords
Land Sale Auctions; Strategic Sequential Bidding; Land Price; Housing Price; Product Differentiation;All these keywords.
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