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The selective enforcement of human rights? The international response to violent humanitarian crises and gross violations of human rights in the Post-Cold-War era
[Die selektive Bearbeitung von humanitären Krisen und massiven Menschenrechtsverletzungen: Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme]

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  • Binder, Martin

Abstract

How did the international community respond to violent humanitarian crises and gross violations of human rights after the end of the Cold War? While from an optimistic perspective on global governance it is argued that humanitarian crises have been increasingly addressed, skeptics maintain that this response has been highly selective. However, we know very little about the actual extent of selectivity, since so far the international community’s reaction to humanitarian crises has not been systematically analyzed. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by empirically examining the extent and nature of the selectivity. To do so, I identify the most severe humanitarian crises in the Post-Cold War era and examine whether and how the international community has responded to these crises. Concerning response, different modes of action, ranging from humanitarian aid to military intervention, and different actors, viz. states, international institutions, and NGOs, will be taken into account. This approach leads to a more precise picture of selectivity: While the international community responded inconsistently to human suffering, the extent of selectivity is smaller than often claimed, and none of the crises identified here remained completely unaddressed. At a more theoretical level this means that humanitarian norms matter though their impact varies significantly. Why? To understand the politics of selectivity it does thus not suffice to show that humanitarian norms matter: rather, we need to understand why and under what circumstances they do so and, conversely, why and under what circumstances they do not. Therefore, factors that are likely to impact upon the strength of norms-countervailing power considerations, economic interests and institutional path dependencies-will be taken into account in further research on selectivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Binder, Martin, 2007. "The selective enforcement of human rights? The international response to violent humanitarian crises and gross violations of human rights in the Post-Cold-War era [Die selektive Bearbeitung von hum," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2007-307, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbtci:spiv2007307
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    5. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, January.
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