IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wuewwb/70.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Reform der Arbeitslosenversicherung: Markt, Staat oder beides?

Author

Listed:
  • von Berchem, Sascha
  • Berthold, Norbert

Abstract

Free and competitive insurance markets are not able to provide a system which can be considered economically efficient to deal with the material risks of unemployment. Nor are individual unemployment insurance savings accounts – even when regulated by the state – a superior alternative. If the economic feasibility of an unemployment insurance system is not in itself to be put at risk, coverage must in general be the responsibility of the state. However, the present design of state unemployment insurance can only be regarded as very inefficient and requiring urgent comprehensive reform. An increase in individual freedom and responsibility, as well as more competition are at the heart of a promising modern reform concept which takes into account the specific nature of the risk inherent in unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • von Berchem, Sascha & Berthold, Norbert, 2004. "Reform der Arbeitslosenversicherung: Markt, Staat oder beides?," Discussion Paper Series 70, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wuewwb:70
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/22310/1/dp70.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stiglitz, Joseph E. & Yun, Jungyoll, 2005. "Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2037-2067, December.
    2. Topel, Robert H, 1983. "On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 541-559, September.
    3. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2001. "Optionen einer effizienten Gestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung," Kiel Working Papers 1052, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: a Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    5. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 2000. "Productivity gains from unemployment insurance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1195-1224, June.
    6. Hujer, Reinhard & Caliendo, Marco & Thomsen, Stephan L., 2004. "New evidence on the effects of job creation schemes in Germany--a matching approach with threefold heterogeneity," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 257-302, December.
    7. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 741-803, June.
    8. Breyer, Friedrich & Franz, Wolfgang & Homburg, Stefan & Schnabel, Reinhold & Wille, Eberhard, 2004. "Reform der sozialen Sicherung: Kurzfassung," EconStor Books, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 92399.
    9. Martin Feldstein & Daniel Altman, 2007. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 21, pages 35-64, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-438, April.
    11. Orszag, Mike & Snower, Dennis J., 2002. "From Unemployment Benefits to Unemployment Accounts," IZA Discussion Papers 532, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic theory and the welfare state : a survey and interpretation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 279, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Hartmann, Philipp, 1998. "Grenzen der Versicherbarkeit: private Arbeitslosenversicherung," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 6934, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    14. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
    15. repec:bla:econom:v:47:y:1980:i:187:p:351-79 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Rainer Fehn, "undated". "Der strukturell bedingte Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit in Europa - Ursachen und Lösungsansätze," List Monographien 019, List Gesellschaft e.V..
    17. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(367), pages 576-595, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sesselmeier, Werner & Somaggio, Gabriele & Yollu, Aysel, 2006. "Mögliche Implikationen der gegenwärtigen Arbeitsmarktreformen für die zukünftige Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenversicherung," Arbeitspapiere 126, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf.
    2. Berthold, Norbert & Brunner, Alexander, 2007. "Gibt es ein europäisches Sozialmodell?," Discussion Paper Series 100, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
    3. Berthold, Norbert & Fricke, Holger & Kullas, Matthias, 2004. "Mehr institutioneller Wettbewerb in Deutschland: Wirksame Hilfe für die neuen Bundesländer," Discussion Paper Series 73, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sesselmeier, Werner & Somaggio, Gabriele & Yollu, Aysel, 2006. "Mögliche Implikationen der gegenwärtigen Arbeitsmarktreformen für die zukünftige Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenversicherung," Arbeitspapiere 126, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf.
    2. Vodopivec, Milan & Raju, Dhushyanth, 2002. "Income support systems for the unemployed : issues and options," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 25529, The World Bank.
    3. Rürup, Bert, 2005. "Arbeitslosenversicherung: Staatlich, privat oder gemischt? (Unemployment insurance * state-run, private or a combination of both?)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 373-382.
    4. Milan Vodopivec, 2004. "Income Support for the Unemployed : Issues and Options," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14922.
    5. Rürup, Bert, 2005. "Arbeitslosenversicherung: Staatlich, privat oder gemischt? (Unemployment insurance * state-run, private or a combination of both?)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 373-382.
    6. Rürup, Bert, 2005. "Arbeitslosenversicherung: Staatlich, privat oder gemischt? (Unemployment insurance * state-run, private or a combination of both?)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 373-382.
    7. Lutz, Roman, 2006. "Was spricht eigentlich gegen eine private Arbeitslosenversicherung?," IAB-Discussion Paper 200624, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    8. Ruud de Mooij, 2004. "Towards efficient unemployment insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Memorandum 100, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    9. Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, 2012. "Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data," NBER Working Papers 18433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Michau, Jean-Baptiste, 2015. "Optimal labor market policy with search frictions and risk-averse workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 93-107.
    11. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 13967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Guo, Audrey & Johnston, Andrew C., 2020. "The Finance of Unemployment Compensation and its Consequence for the Labor Market," IZA Discussion Papers 13330, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Edi Karni, 1999. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance: A Survey," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(2), pages 442-465, October.
    14. Hartley, Gonzalo Reyes & van Ours, Jan C. & Vodopivec, Milan, 2011. "Incentive effects of unemployment insurance savings accounts: Evidence from Chile," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 798-809.
    15. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2001. "Alternative Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung: das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten und des Vereinigten Königreichs," Kiel Working Papers 1032, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    16. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    17. Sebastian Koehne & Moritz Kuhn, 2015. "Should unemployment insurance be asset-tested?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(3), pages 575-592, July.
    18. Rubén Castro & Michael Weber & Gonzalo Reyes, 2018. "A policy for the size of individual unemployment accounts," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 7(1), pages 1-11, December.
    19. Raj Chetty, 2004. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance When Income Effects are Large," NBER Working Papers 10500, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Andrew C. Johnston, 2021. "Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor Demand: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Administrative Data," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 266-293, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wuewwb:70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/viwuede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.