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Was spricht eigentlich gegen eine private Arbeitslosenversicherung?

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  • Lutz, Roman

Abstract

"Ziel der Arbeit ist die bisher fehlende versicherungsökonomische Fundierung in der Argumentation über die Privatisierung der Arbeitslosenversicherung. Anders als in bisherigen Ansätzen werden die Begründungen gegen eine Privatisierung in eine versicherungstechnische und eine sozialpolitische Perspektive zerlegt. Hierdurch soll die häufig zu beobachtende Vermengung von objektiv-technischen und normativen Argumenten aufgebrochen werden. Im Ergebnis wird herausgearbeitet, dass letztlich nur das normative Argument der 'relativen Armut' gegen eine private Arbeitslosenversicherung spricht. Demnach ist die Belastungswirkung risikoäquivalenter Prämien für Personen mit hohem bis mittlerem Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko sozialpolitisch nicht vertretbar. Als wenig stichhaltig erweisen sich dagegen versicherungstechnische Argumente wie positive Korrelation der Einzelrisiken, Moral Hazard, unzureichende Prämiendifferenzierung sowie kollektive Unterschätzung des individuellen Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos. Als Lösung für das Problem der 'relativen Armut' wird ein neuer Entwurf zur Privatisierung der Arbeitslosenversicherung vorgestellt. Zentrales Element ist hierbei die kombinierte Versicherung von Arbeitslosigkeit und Langlebigkeit in einem Versicherungsprodukt." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

Suggested Citation

  • Lutz, Roman, 2006. "Was spricht eigentlich gegen eine private Arbeitslosenversicherung?," IAB-Discussion Paper 200624, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
  • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabdpa:200624
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    Cited by:

    1. Hohendanner, Christian, 2007. "Verdrängen Ein-Euro-Jobs sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigung in den Betrieben?," IAB-Discussion Paper 200708, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    2. Eckey, Hans-Friedrich & Schwengler, Barbara & Türck, Matthias, 2007. "Vergleich von deutschen Arbeitsmarktregionen," IAB-Discussion Paper 200703, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    3. Blien, Uwe & Kirchhof, Kai & Ludewig, Oliver, 2006. "Agglomeration effects on labour demand," IAB-Discussion Paper 200628, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bundesrepublik Deutschland ; Armut ; private Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Privatisierung ; Risiko ; Sozialpolitik ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Versicherungsbeitrag;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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